A response to M.B. Foster's critique of Hegel's political thought by Peddle, David




Sr.Jobu's
A Response to
M.B. Poster's Critique of
Heaeh political Tbouebt
by
DAVID PEDD LE
A thesis submitted to th e School of Grad uate
Studies in part ial fulfilment of the
requ ireme nts for the degr ee of
1\1as ter of Arls
Depart ment of Philosophy
l'l emor i:11Universi ty ofNc wfour.dland
July 1992
Newfoundland
1+11 National Libfaryorcco aoa Blb liottlCqucnallOOfilccocaooca
Acquisitionsand oecctco des acql~sltlOllS 01
Bibliogr aphic Services Branch des services b,bli og r<lphiqlJC~
J95 WelllngIooSt'''t' 1 3!Y." I\JCWl'llor,glon
~~'~pnw", ~IT~ON~~ ,"I(l}
The aut hor has gran ted an
irrevocab le non-exclusi ve licence
allowing th e National library of
Canada to rep rodu ce, loa n,
distribute or sell copies of
his/her th esis by any means and
in any form or format, making
this thesis: availa ble to interested
persons.
The author retains own ership of
the copy right in his/her thesis.
Neither the thesis nor su bstantial
extra cts from it may be print ed or
otherwise rep rodu ced witho ut
his/her permission .
L'aut eur a accor de una licence
irrevoc able at non exclus ive
permett ant it la Bibllothequ e
nationals du Canada de
reproduire, preter, distribuer ou
vendre des copies de sa these
de quelque manlere et sous
quelqu e fo rme que ce soit pour
mettre des exemp laires de ceUe
these it la disposit ion des
personnes Interessees .
L'auteur conserve la pr cp rlete du
droit d'auteur qui protege sa
these . Ni la these ni des extraits
substantiels de celle-ci
doivent eire rmpn mes ou
autrem ent repr odu its sans son
autor isation.
I SBN 0-315-86616-0
Canada
TAB I.E OF CONTENTS
A BSTR ACT ...
;\ C t' iIIOW l. EUGEI\ l t:NT .
C II" I'1'ER 1;I NTHOIHJCTI O :'<l ; S l ll\l i\lAI{ Y O F
FOSTt:R'S CIUTlC ISi\ IS
. iii
C IIA)'TER 2:TII E l'n t:St JI' I'OSITI O NS OF C IVil . SOC lt :T" ..... 12
2.1 Stare-of-Natur e .., .. 1,1
2.2 l hcl\1 oral WiI1 Ie.
23 Family Lite .. 22
C l lAI'TE n J: IIEGE L'S ANAI.YSIS 011C1 VI I, SOCU;TY 2(,
3.1 The Systcm of' Necds; 26
3.2 The Administration orJustice n
33 Public Authority and Corpormlon J:'i
CI IAI'TEn. 4 :FOSTE I~'S CItITIQlJE
{)1' rm: IIEGEU AN STATE ..
4. 1 Hegel'sPlatonism ..
42 Ruler and Ruled .
4.3 Institutions and Putriotism.. '"
40
. 41
4]
4(,
C II AI'TE n. 5: C HITICISJ\f o r FO ST ER'S ANALYSIS I: fiE GEL' S
CONCE PTION OF Til E IDEAL AND T ilE R EAL ... .. 50
5.1 The Eternity of the State ..... . 50
5.2 The Slate as Both Essence and Existence 53
5.3 The Real and the Ideal State 55
5.4 Dialcctic oft hcReal andthe Jdeal ... . 58
C II AI'T I.;n. 6: CHlTI CI SJ\f OF FO STEn.'S A NALYSI S II : H EGEL' S
CONC EI'T ION OFTII£' REI..ATIO N OFTlI E
STAT io: TO Til E INDIVIDUAL .. . 61
6.1 The Ruling Class .. . 6 1
6.2 IJildung andL aw .. . . 63
6.) Parliament and Patriotism .. .. 65
6.4 Concluslon. . 67
ENONOTES 70
1H1JI.10 GnAI'IIY . 14
iii
ABSTRACT
Michael Beresford Foster's book The pQlitjcal Phi1mQliliicL2Ll1atQ...nud.Ileucl
crystallizes much of the criticism which liberal theorists direct against Hegel's political
philosophy. 1nitsgrasp ofthevarious trendswhichdevelop inthe courseof!wenticthcentury
liberalism, Foster' s work is, in fact, remarkable. Ilis criticismbrings to lighl lh<: importani
relationshipbclweenl iberalismand th~"event theory" ofactionand hisl ory . Throughwntings
fromOnkeshonto Rorty thisrelationshiphasbeendevelopednndin FOSler's workh eppcnrs
vividly contrasted with Hegel's views or, more accurately. with 11 liljernl caricature of his
views. Foster's work is also remarkablein that, although he hrings interestingquestions 10
Hegel's political thought, his criticism thoroughly misrepresents Hegel' s argument,merely
thrusting a dualistic perspective of his ownupon Hegel's dialecticalstnndlloint. As a result
heis insensitive to thesubtlerelationshipswhichHegeldevelops, forexample,betweendesire
and reason. individual and state, freedom and history, and history and eternity. In every
instance Foster assumes the radical separation of these concepts, all the wf',ire fhiling
adequately to criticize Hegel's attempts to reconcile tbcirapparent opposition. Onthe basis
of'tbis method Foster resolves that Hegel' s political thought is"confused" and results in a
totalitarianrepressionof individual freedom.
Theburden of this thesisisto disentangle Hegel's actualargument fromthesnarl which
Foster creates. To this end I show the dialectical relationships which Hegel cstnblishcs
betweensuchconceptsas"real"and"ideal";freedomandauthority;andstale andhistory. The
essentialpointof this analysisis to showthat, for Hegel, all socio-political institutions are in
principle manifcstaucas of humanfreedom. Consequently, I hope10show thattheclaimthat
Hegel's political thought develops an authoritarianand repressiveslate docs not hold water.
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CIIAI'TE R ON E
INTRODUCTION: A SUMMAIIY OF FOST ER'S CIlITIC ISII1S
M.B. Fosler's book Ibr PQlitjcal }l bjlQsopb jcs of PJal2..Jlll.d...lk1d has been widely
praised. T ,M. Knox, for example. whose translation oflhc~~is lhc English
standard.argues thatFoster's workon Hcgelisindispensable.t MichaelOnkcshotr,inhis1935
review of Foster 's book. contends that it is "one of the most profound and iIIumin:lling
contr ibutions to the litera ture of political philosoph y which has appea red in recent years."?
Onereason forFoster's successisthathecrystallizesmuchof'thecriticismwhichliberal
theorists direct against Hegelian-idealist philosophy: narrowing freely from Hobbes and
Locke, heattempts to show that the liberalnotions ors tarc of nature. sovereignty,ccrumct.
and freedom provide a bulwark against state dominance which idealistphilosophers fail to
provide. Further, Fosler' sargument isnot meant to resultin a systematicaccount ufpolitical
life but is, rather, accumulativeand ructaphcrieel. He conceives thenotionsaroundwhich he
constructs his argument not as truthsabout polhicallifebutrather as aesthetic creations For
Foster,philosophyisanalogousto poetryanditsconceptsmust beseen ascrcerivcdcscriplions
of historically situated occasions and concepts. Philosophical reason, he contends, is thus
essentiallycontingent, it cannot go beyondor behind history to contemplate eternity. His
emphasis on the mctaphoricity and historicity of tbcughtare expressionsof his beliefin the
contingencyoftruthand reflect the liberalsuspicionof'Hcgcl'srationaldeductionof thc state.
Foster wishes to usc liberal theory to explicateand criticise Hegel's account. It is
important, however, to consider Foster's own standpoint before we discuss his criticism of
Hegeland to thisend I shallatlemptto drawintoacoherent argumentthe variousmetaphors
Another reason for the success of this book is Fosler' s interesting analysis of Plato' s
political thought. Though this analysisisessentialto Foster's book, hiscriticismofl legel
canbe understood with minimum reference to these sections.
and concepts which he employs.
The concept of the state of nt/u re represents man's original pre-political condition.
Fromthewriling!'ofTholnasHobbesto RobertNozickthisconcept has beenusedto elucidate
Ihe r.ccessarycharacteristicsof political life byderiving them from its simplest non-political
assumptions. In Foster's argument, however, the concept of'thc state of nature is not simply
a tool for definition. Accordine to Foster, thesigniticsnce of'thc "state of nature" is that it
ascribe s real. temporal existence, not mere logical priority, 10 man's non-political life.
Therefore the state (.f nalure can be seen to have its own substance and laws, and menin the
stareof nature can bcdcscribcd asalreadyessentially formedand not as mere mailer awaiting
the formof politicalsociety. Mencan thereforebe seen to have rights and freedoms which
sternnol fromthe state but fromIheir m fural condition, a freedom governed not bythe laws
nn lle state btlt by the laws of nature. And this is Foster' s central point, that the individual
has righls prior 10 allsocio-potitical relationsand funher that all soeio-pclhical relations can
onlybcjustifiedin so far as theyrespect,enhanceand preserve therightsof the individual. He
argues, however. that the temporal differentiation orste te of nature and politicalsociety is
retainedinpolitiealsocietyasanactuaJoistinctionbetween societyandSlate,betweenthedilly
interaction of self-inlerested individuals and the artificial laws and in$\:tutions which men
create as means 10 their individual ends.
Foster finds Locke's nccount ofnalurnl law more suited to his purposes than Hobbes'
account. Unlike Hobbes, Locke sees natural law as operative in the state of nature and
thereforeas providing for timitanonscn thescopeofcivillawinsociety. AccordingtoFoster,
Locke' s view of the state of'nature grants the subjectfreedoms prior 10 the determination of
civillaw
FOSler contends that there are two different senses of the laws of nature, roughly an
empiricist and a rationalist sense. On the one hand. Foster claims, the empiricists focus on
those natural laws to which the netions ofme n an: subject by virtueof'thcir appcntivcnature
On the other, he argues, rationalists attend 10 those 1:1\\'s "10which mall owed obedience in
virtue ofhis rational nature" ,'
In rationalist and empiricist forms oflib cmlthcury. civil society is said to begoverned
by natural law, Foster argues that in civilsociety tl:e"appel itivc" lmvsofuature are lllainl"illl'li
as economic law, and the subject is free in the economic realm11ulyin ~l nlr ushis ilctillllSarc
determined by nothing hut his own likes or dislikes· Appetitiveac tivity.ntuurallyuml without
conscious direction, generates a law and ord er of its own ' Unlike mere manor which is
unintelligibleunless in-formed by an activity external to it. the uninhihitcd activity nf'human
appetite lind desire generates lawsand therefore also generates its o wn intelligibility.· Further,
Foster contends that vranc nal", natural law is maintained in civil society as till.'IInivl.'rsal rules
of'conduct which safeguard person, property and contract, i.c. civil law, The main points of
Foster' s argument arc that, contrary to Hegel's view, the subjec t unuins a fully udcquntc
freedom incivilsociety andthat this economic realmis tully inlelligihle, i c..uslnwsarcavailnhlc
10 consciousness, It is signifi cantth atthis realm be law-like , according to FOSler, because it
then has its own form andcannot be subordinntc tvthc suucasmailer to lil1"111, Heargues thnt
because economic laws originate in relativelyuninhibited desires and civil laws arc means ttl
individual satisfaction, the individual is freebecause subject only to desirenndluws which arc
a m C;' IlS to desire.
According to ro ster, Locke's doct rine of propertydevelops ancmpiricist doctnne til'civil
law while Kant's doctrine of the moral law is a rationalist development of thc same principle
Liberals of both the empiricist and the rationalist stripe SCI.' civil law as a reasonable system
In the Platonic metaphysics, with which Fosler wishes 10 identify Hegel's thought, the
activity ofin-fcr ming mailer is the activity of a dcmiurge. In Foster's broader argument
he contrasts the activity ofthe domiurgc, which is confined to the uniting of pre-existent
matter and form, withthe activityofthc Christiangod, which creates both matter and form
which can he deduced fromILP.DOD prin- 'plcs. They differ flmdarncntally, however, in that
whilerationalistssee civillawand right conduczas ends-in-themselves which limiteconomic
motives, empiricists relegate civil lawto the status of a means 10economicends."
Ies ter !lolds10the traditional liberalview that society should aimto limit legislationso
ttl:1l it rcfr<l insfrominterfering withtheworkingof economie lawswithintheeconomicsphere,
the mainconditionofa freeeconomyon thisview beingthe integrity of person, propertyand
contract whichpreservesa sphere ofconduct independentoft heintrusion ofany determinant
save desire Further, though Fosler docs not clearly make the point himself. it is consistent
with his argument to hold th,1l the integrity of persons preserves 11 sphere of conduct
independent of the intrusion of any determinantsave conscience. The point of Fosler's
argumentis that,as described in"stateofnature"accounts. the operation ofnaturallaw grants
the individunlafreedom fromanydeterminationsavehisown reason or desire
Foster develops his liberal conception of freedom through his distinctionof civil or
economic society, whichisgovernedby naturallaw, fromthe slate whose laws arc artificial.
Following ll nbhcs, Fosterargues that the laws of tileslate have authority notbyvirtue ofany
inherent reasonableness but by virtue of being commanded" Though Foster contends that
Ilohhes docs notexplicitly distinguish civil societyandstate, he also contends that Hobbes'
view thatsocietyis constinncd byan act ofwiIJand isthus artificial, "presents thegermfrom
which the distinction could grow"!
In Hobbes' account, society has its genesis in thestale ofnature (whichhe portrays as
a snuc of wnrring). He argues that the people out of fear of death and the desire for self-
preservationcontract together and give up to a sovereigntheir natural rightas individuals to
protect themselves.Therefore as Onkcshon puts it, thesovereign,"is not theinterpreterof the
various warns of the subjects bUI the custodian of theirwill for peace"." For Hobbes. the
people' s willisunited in thesovereign who is the sole arbiter of what is requiredfor peace."
The significance of thisargument, for Foster, is that thewilland not reason is the source of
obligat ion
From this concep t cf so vereignty r oster derives his own con cept of the free win
Wherea s econo mic act ivity is a submission of the will to appe tite lind 1I10lalactivity is 11
submission ofthewillto reason, thc acrivity of the sovereig n willis subj ect tono dl'l l'flninalinn
other than itself. As thus sel f-dete rmined, the will's activi ty is esse ntially cr eative and
therefore. Free
Foster conceives the act ivity of the free will on analogy with nnis tic nctivuy ami he
cont rasts his view of'nrt totha t o fPlato . Plato criric izcsf bc creativ e clement inan and contends
that art is to be valued o nly in so far as it can be known as an embodiment o ra precollceived
form . Foster , by contrast, argues that one is unnblet o rende r the rcnsnn nf'the wnrkofm t and
that arti stic activity docs not simply execute a preconceived plan hut is, in 111et , a creativ e
activity whose produc t thus ca nno t be criticized by some extern al sumdurd' Thi s position
subord inates the conce pt ori n-formation to the concep t or crcadon: while the <lfllsllllll SIhring
form to the matter of'his art , his ac tivity is const ituted as "aest hetic" so lely hy virtue ofan
indeterminate act oflmagination Likewise , the sove reign will subordinates natural law (at
least in its rationa l aspect) to its creative ac tivity. According to Foster, the sovereign creates
the laws, perhaps treat ing so called "na turallaw" as a means to the ends or civil 1111'1. For
examp le, the sovereign may realize that unless he recognises ce rtain "m il l/fit l rigll ts" he will
not be able to rule because the cit izens will not he happy and wi ll there fore he rebellious
Natural law and natu ra l right arc su bord inated to the pragmatic co nsiderat ions of sla tccrafi
and the will of thc sovere ign, Fos te rconte nds that unlike Il egcl , who socsuc onomic and mflml
law to be of'timc lcss, llmimi deriv ation, he co nceives these laws to he the histo rical produc ts
of the individual aes thetic will, Though econ omic Jaw would see m to he the prod uct of'dcsire,
Foster also cons iders sovere ign act ivity by analogy with Go d's c reat ive activity For the
purpo sesoft his essay,howev er, Foster' s specific critlcisn s of'l Icgcl' s political philosop hy
can be consi .rcd without refe rence to this clement o f his argu ment
forFoster thccharactcriza ticn ofanysetof'cvcntsas"law" isacreativeactboth intheselection
of relevant facts and inthe description ofth cir inter-relation
It follows, according10Foster, that there arc two waysin whichthe stale is analogous
to the productof an artisticactivity.II Onthe ailehand thestate, like the "meaning" ora work
oja rt, liasno naturalexistence, Andon theother hand, becausethe actofcreationisgoverned
by nopre-conceivedend, the essence ofthe state is notdiscernable fromitsaccidents;thestate
is :1II individual andcannot be criticized from some standpoint external to it.\l
F!"t JlII this view of sovereignty 115 an essentially creative activity, FOSler developsa
conception of'thcstale whichhebelieves willguaranteeindividual freedom. Individuals are
freeinthat theirccutmcno enter into a politicalsocietyisdeterminedbynothingbut theirown
desireanti reason. More signilicantly, however, individuals arc free because thestate which
they construct isartitlclal, the product of a creativehuman will. Further, he contends that it
is (lot incompntiblewithliobbcs' view {though he doesn't bother to demonstrate thisclaim)
to transfer thepower of sovereignty fromthe monarchto the people. He arguesthat in the
modernstatesovereigntyis seento reside inthe people, andgovernmentis subordinateto this
sovereign will. In this view the subject of government is himsclf the sovereigi authority to
which he submits.'! The upshot of Foster's view of sovereignty is thaI it portrays both the
governor and the governedas equ al in their SUbjection to the sovereignand the governor as
in filet <Jminister of the sovereign: For Foster because the state is the product ofa creative
will, it docs not force individuals10conformto some eternalstandard. Therefore, if thestate
is 110t satisfactoryit canbe recreated to conform more fully to the desiresof the individuals
it is created to serve. Foster leaves the nature of the"collectivity" of'Individualsunspecified
Fosler contrasts thisviewtowhat he believes tobe Hegel's platonismwhichsubordinates
the subjects 10those who govern. In the 'so-called' platonicview, those who governthe
stale do so hy virtueof their knowledgeof its reasonable essence. Those whoare subject
tnthcs c rulers arc subject precisely because they cannot understand the essential reason
of'rbcstatc
however , In his view, the union ofindividual wills, because an artificial product, onlyarises
in spec ifichistorical circumstances . It is the product of theun iqlle politicnlaCli\<ityofaljiv en
people and is contingent upon the particular context of people. time, and place in whicn it
arises.
The subjection of'thc people only to themselves disunguishus the state not only from
nature but in some respects even from the work ofart . According to Foster, where as the wor k
oran is caused by something externalto itself, the sla te bceusasulbecause the sovereign will
is not only the cause of the state but is also Contained in the state; is both subjec t and ohjeet
of its own activity. While the activity which gives birth to the work of art ar.li!o the state is
similarly creat ive, the products themselves are to be distinguished . li e argues tnm the
individualis free ir,this society because he lakes part int hccreationofl he laws which bcobcys.
because he creates the co ntext for tbc enac tment of his individual will
It is important to note, however, that for Foste r, as formostlibe rals, the state is ncither
necessary to nor constitut ive of the individual's freedom but is rather , merely an artitlcial
condition of it. This is significant in a numbcr of'ways . First, much lihcml v.cory denies Illat
there is anesse ntial sclfwhich is somehow given embodiment inthc subjcc t 'aec tioos. Politicnl
activity is thus to be seen as just one among many ac tivities which indivduals may perform.
It is not com prehensive of the individual 's other act ivities, rather. it is merely n means to
whatever activ ity the individual wishes to pursue. O n this view, the primary function of the
state is 10 rest rict individuals from interfering with each other but such constraint is not itself
to he thought constitutive of freedom. By contrast with Hegel's arg ument where freed om
begins with submission to law. in Foster' s argument. an act is free on ly in so I ar as it is not
determined by any standard external to itself. In obed ience 10 law one is not free, no matt er
how important obedience is to one's further freedoms
Because the stale is seen as the prod uct ofa creative act, il cannot be developed from
its co ncept through a necessary deduc tion and is thereforc co ntingent : neither the necessary
product of the individual' s willnor the end or completionof hisacts. Therefore, there is no
oneslate whichcanbetheperfectslatebecauseallstatesaresubjectto the contingentchoices
of individunls and the contingent circumstances of history, In fact, rather than speakingof
"the" state weran onlyspeakof "a" statebecause there simplyis no"essential" state beyond
the inJiviJualstnleswhichexi sti nh islory
It follows from foster's view of the general objects of history, that is, his view of
individualsandstates, that history itselfcannot be seen asa necessarydevelopment. Hehas
an"event" theory of history whichissimilarto the theories of'Heidcggcr and Nietzsche. In
lhis view history docs n01have a necessary rational development; rather on analogy with
created objects, eachhistoricalepochis its own justificationandcan be subjeclto no external
stnndardof'criticis,n Foster's viewof historyis non-teleological; hearguesthat while history
nmybe seenns a development. there is no end towards whichit is progressing. From this
standpoint, various epochs may he interpreted as a development only in the sense thai
individualshavennopportunityto learnfromthe pastandtomaintainitsdiscoveriesin science,
Ilhilnsnphy.customs.laws.etc.:thcrcisnoneed\0 re-inventthewheeLHowever, thoughwhat
has been accomplished becomesthe starting point of a new epoch, it mayjust as easily be
overturnedasbuillupon. For Fosterthere isno truthunderlyingthe variousepochsofbistory;
ruther there nrconlytilecreativeinterpretations ofhistorians. Fosterconceiveshistory, state,
and reasonbyanalogywithcreativeactivityand hearguesthat there isno reality to be ascribed
10these realmsotherthanone whichiscreated
Poster's critiqucofflcgcl isa significant work becauseit isrepresentativeofmuch liberal
criticismof'idcnlist political philosophy. We find inLT . Hobbhouse for example a criticism
on tcgct's conceptioncfthc relationofrealityandthought, which makes itsway into Foster's
argument llobbhousc states that Hegel' s philosophy;
nttrjburcs the unitywhich belongstothe conceptas
containedin the act of thinking to the massof'objects
to whichthe concept refers."
Inmuchthesamevein FostercriticizesHegel's uuiuugol'theconceptof thestale, a 1I1::re
metaphysical construct, with particular andactualstales . AlsoMichael Oakes1l011 concurs
withFoster' scriticismoft hcconccpt of thcstate asthcrealizationofhununIrccdom" Isaiah
Berlin, another liberalofnote,follows Foster in his rcjectionof'thcorgnnicthcoryor tbc slate,
of the concept of a rational will, and ofa rational,hlstoricalncccssity.!" Likewise Fo!>ter's
conception of historyisechoed in Richard RortY' S~\Jl.~lru.L.Sclid\llil)~ , where
Rorty argues that historycannot be referred awayfrom itself, that it is a product ,If '·lime and
chance"." To respondto Foster's analysisof l Icgcl thus brings one into direct contact with
some of the most important streams of twentieth century libe ralism
Though Foster' criticismsof l he r.l.illQ~~,mlu'_QrujillUme oftenwideor thcmark .hedoes
bring some important questions to bear upon Hegel's pohucaltho uglu, :nul the contrast
between hisown standpointandHegel'shelps clarify whatllcgc l isiu fact saying. '1'(1answer
Foster' s cr iticisms isalso to clarify someof the typicOi lli heml /l1 isrepfeSe/1l;l li(lJl.~ IIf IJegel' s
political philosophy.
The thrust of myconsideration of the presuppositionsorc ivil society illChapter Two
andcrucacl'sconceptofcivilsociety inCbaplerThree is toshow that civil societyis an ethical
realm,inHegel' sview,and not merelyancconomicrcnlmnsl'ostcrcontcnds. Foster considers
Hegel's account of civil society from a dualistic standpoint. I Ic speaks. for example, of il
division of thccconomicwitlandtheethicalwillinIIcgcl's conceptofcivilsociety. The general
difficulty is that by virtue of this dualism FOSler is not attentive to the dialectical nature of
Hegel' s thought and its thoroughand concrete mediationofuniversalandparticular interests
I hopeto show that Hegel'sconcept ofcivilsocietyhas anethicaland not a "natural" starling
point in that it assumes the individual to be a self-consciousmoral agent who has received
ethical education as a familymember. Also I hope to showthat Ilegel conceives civil society
to be a manifestationof the subject' s freedom.
' 0
Chapte r Four is explicitlyconcerned with Foster's criticism of the philosophica l basis
of'the Hegelianstate . Foster arguesthaiHegel's viewson such mattersas the relation of the
ind ividual 10 thc state and the relatio n of ind ividuals and the slate to history, are based on a
platonicmetaphysics. Further, hecontends thatHegel's politicalthought is involved indeep
scaledcontradictions. Heslatesthat whileHegel,asa rationalist, isverymuchconcernedwith
the freedom n r the individual, his thought remains wedded to a platonic meta physics which
grounds the actual, historical world of hurnan action upon a spurious conce pt ofits eternal
essenceand is therefore antitheticalto humanfreedom: According10FOSler, Hegel views
the realworld of'contingentactionandtemporalstates as the mere appearanceof an eternal
ideal. lie argues that thissubordinationof actualindividual choicesto their so called "ideal
essence"is manifested in Hegel's concept of theclass structure of thestate.
Foster developshis rain! bycontrasting Hegel's viewto the liberal theoryof the state
for whichcivil societyis the onlypoliticalstructureconsisteot with individual freedom. Civil
socictyhasits origin,Foslerclaims,inthefreechoiceof'individ ualsandisa meansto individual
satisfaction. On this view the state is subordinated to civil society, its purpose to provide
legislation whichrestrictsinterferencewith the aims of individuals.
Accordingto Fosler, mostindividualsarc engagedinthe particular pursuits character-
isric ofcivil societyandtherefore a univcrsallawofthc typeHegelbelievescanbeknownonly
in the slate is in principlebeyondthe purviewof thecitizensof civil society. Andfor Foster,
this is the tendency of the platonicclement in Hegel's thought; to establisha class division
betweenthose whorule on thebasisofthcir knowledge of the universal and those who obey
all the basis of theirknowledge of'thc merely particular.
Foster argues, however, that Hegel is 100 steeped in the rationalist emphasis on
FOSler maintnlusthat Hegel' sconsiderationoffreedomisfurther limited inthat it doesnot
comprehend the empiricistviewpoint.
individualfreedomto accept the Platonic notion of a "philosopher-king" which alone can
renderhisview consistent byestablishing thatonly a select fewcan knowthe universal law
and mustimpose it upon thosewhocannot knowit
InChaptersFiveandSixI respond toPester's criticismthatHcgcl'spoliucalphllosophy
is based on a metaphysicalconception of the state and of history. l 11Cimportantpoint to
recognize is thatHegel's political philosophyseeks 10 comprchend all such dichotomies as
individual and state, timeand eternity, necessity andconungcucy. Ouly by ignoring the
dialecticalmovement ofHcgc1's thought canposte r maintain the radical separationo f such
conceptsasrulerand ruledandideallind real.The PhjlQSophyofRjI;hl iscsscruiully anattempt
to showthe unityof the subjectiverealmofindividualself-consciousness with theobjective
realmofthe state. In Hegel's philosophy, whether wespeak ofhistory orof the state we arc
neverspeakingofsome transcendentsphereoutside the realmofhumanthought andac tion
In this thesis I hope to showthat, for Hegel, the state is the objective embodimentofl lle
subjectivewillandthe developmentof historyis nothingother than thedevelopmenl ur tbe
consciousness of this objective freedom.
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CIIAPTERTWO
TilE I'HESUPPOSITlONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY
Accord ing \0 Fosler I I~gcl failsto demonstrate that the transition from civil society to
the stare is necessary for ethicallifb. Hegel's depiction of civil society, he argues, meets alt
the criteria for whatI legc!callsethical life andbecause thereis, therefore, norealmofgreat7r
universality than thai establishedbythe systemof civillaw, there isn onecessity fora transition
beyond the civil realm. lie contends that Hegel makes IIspurious distinction between civil
societyand the state. conceivingcivilsocietyasanimperfect realization ofethicallifeandthat
he limits civil society \0 asphcrc Iorthccxcrciscofthc economic will. Heargues that inHegel's
vlcwthcmcrnbc rsofciv ilsociety,bycontraslwith the citizens ofthe state,areconcernedsolely
with theirow n personal satisfactions. Further Foster states that Hegelwrongly distinguishes
the laws which operate incivilsoctcryrtom those whichoperatei n theslate, inthat he contrasts
the univcrsnl Jnws of tilestate. which are opcrauvc only so far as the individual understands
nnd willsthem, with theeconomic laws of tile civil realm, which are actualized whethercr not
the subject is conscious ofthom II Hec1aimsthat, forHe gcl, inorder that thesubject' sfrecdom
he fullyactua lized, he must be conscious of tile law which he is to obey, so that a transition
from civilsoc iety10 the state is thus required in order that the subjectbeethically free.
Fosler argues, however, that Ilegel' s requirement that civil society "pass over" into the
stntc arises from a confused conception of civil society. In Hegel's view, he maintains, the
un iversalla w which is actualized in the state only in so far as the subject is conscious of it,
ope rates with or without the subject's consciousness in civil society. However, according to
Fm ler, lhere is no such universal which operates both unconsciously in civil society and also
in the stale so rhr as the subject is consciouseeeeof it. He argues thatfor Hegel there are two
kinds of'laws which operate in civil society, on the one hand economiclaw,which arises from
13
'-:130'5 appetitive nature, and on the other hand civil law, which arises fr om man's !:Iliona l
nature. But the universal lawsof economics cannot be theuniversal \v which Hegel refers
because thoughthe y operate unconsciously in civilsoc iety,consciousness of them docs no t
imply a transition 10 thestate." Fosler claims that civil law, by comrast. operates onlyso far
astheindividualcon sciouslywillsit. soheconcludcsthat inl lcgcl's argumcntethical freedom ,
a willwhich wills the universal, is in fact rea lized in civ il society . Civilsoc iety thus contains
aUthat is necessary forethical lire and it follows that there is no necessityfor making the
transition fromcivil society to the stale.
Hence Hegel, accordingto Foster, by his failure to recognize civillaw lIS an adequate
basisof ethicallife , merely applies the rationalist conceptionof civilsociety to his conception
of the state. Thus whenHegelcriticizescivil lawbecauseit isenforced onlyasn meansto the
particularsatisfaction ofi ndividuals, heis in factmerely criticizingthe empiricist conceptio n
of civil law and moreover, in hisconcept of the state he merely putsa mtionulist concept of
civil law in its place.
Fostergoes on toarguethatHegel's rationalism is notcompatiblewilhhumanfreedom
because it subordinateswill to rcason. Fosler arguesthat itisconsistent withthis"rationalist"
strain in Hegel's thought that it is the individualand nor society which must he transformed
in order that ethical lifebe actualized. Foster stales that in Hegel's view;
... the subjectshouldsubmit bimsclf'toa mont!educa-
tion whichwill enable him 10 renouncethe economic
will, for which alonethe law is a restriction, and to
ascend to thestandpoint at which he cnnrecognize the
system oflaw as thesystem ofreason, inobediencero
which ' ethical' freedom consists?"
Fostercontendsthat this rationalism, definedoverand against the empiricist v' icwpoint,
isat the rootofHegc1'sfailuretodcvclcpa properconception of will. l ie claims Ihatahhoug h,
inHegel' sconception, the will isactiveinthe internalizationor obiccuvclaws,"the perfectio n
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of wilLconsists in its s urrender ofaulonomya nd its submissio n to t he primacyofthought."J1
Foster argu es that in distinguishing willfromboth appetite andreaso n,and arguingthat the
will mustconformitsclf'tc a rational principle, Hegelsubjugates will to thought.
(I) State-o f-Nature as the Presupposition of S ociety
Foster' s argument owes a great deal to the state-o f-nature accounts of Hobbes and
Locke. Like these liberal theorists, Foster asserts thatindividaal freedom is prior to society
andis anaun butc of'humansin their naturalcondition. On this view, whateversocial order
emerges must enhance but not contrad ict this 'natural' freedo m. As discussed above,
according to Fosler, civil society issuch a social order and he arg ues, therefore, that the
cccccprion of a state beyondcivil society is supertluous.
Fosler gl1lns onlO lIegcl' s thought hisown viewthat the only presupposition of this
"economicrea lm" is fl multiplicityorindividuals who are mo tivatedsoldy by self-intercstand
natural desire and the consequenceof this view, that i ndi vid~s can achieve ethicalr:fe only
if they renounce their "economic will" .
Inthis chapter I hopeto show that Foster' s starting point, the liberalnotion ofa "state
of nature", is an inadequate approach to the quest ion of civilsociety, because, although it
encmpts to portray the subject' s pre-political condition, it actually presupposes that the
subject hasreceived ctbiceleducation Hegel, by contrast, explicitly accounts for the ethical
I,..ducationwhichcivilsocietyassumes:he tracesthe developmentoft hepresuppositionsofcivil
society in terms of'thc moral will and the family.
For Hegel civil societypresupposes individualswho arefree agents, whose desires are
not simplygiven but a re, infact, particularizations ofthe ind ividual's self-conscious freedom.
Inother words, inIlcge l's view individualsaredefined15 freedomprimarilyandnot as desire
with freedom superadded. According to Hegel the members of civil society arc capable of
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moral self-consciousness andintention; theyhavebeeneduca ted by the culture offamilyIite;
and arc no t merely self-intereste d individuals . I continue thi s discu ssion in Cha pter Three
attempting 10 showthat Hegel's concept of dvi! sccictycvcrywhcrcassumes theunionof the
subject's universalethicalinterest andhis own merely personal interest. Contrary to Foster's
portrayal. Hegel does not assume a division between thee thicaland the economicrealms
According to Hegel, state-of-nature accounts arc unt enable precisely because they
spe ak of the individua l in abstra ction fro m society lind desc ribe social relations from the one-
sidedviewpointofthis isolated individual. Intheaccountso fLo ckcand Hobbes. ferexample,
societyexists asameans toindividualsatisfaction, or tospeak innmore metaphysicalmanner,
the universal is subjugated10 the particular, Hegel argllcsthat, stllrting from the stnndpoint
of the isolated individual, it is impossible to derive an adequate account of the community
unlessonepresuppose that individualsarcalreadysocialized. Abriefconsidcrationofllo bbes'
and Locke' s account of the transitionfrom the stale of nature 10 the "contract" reveals this
presupposition
Hobbes demonstratesthe necessity for the movement fromthe state of nature to civil
society in that a state of war is unbearable for isolated individuals in the slate of nature
However, nowhere in hisargument isthereademonstration ofthe possibilityof'thismovcmcnr
because he doesnot show how thelack of trust, characteristic of the state-of-nature, could be
overcome; he merely assumes that it is.
Locke, onthe otherhand, hasa fullergrasp of thepotentialities of tile natural stare. that
is to say, that it may be either peaceful nr warring. There nrc two ways in which Locke's
transition froma slate of nature to civil society is moreconvincing thanHobbes. In Locke's
account the state of nature, even were it peaceful, is show n to be inadequate because war is
always possible. Second, Locke shows the possibililyof a contract. Ina peaceful situation
there is trust and thus contracts are possible.
Locke' s concept ofpeaee, however, is still an abstraction; peace involves a mediation
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of disputes whichLock e docs not account for. In the wo rld of nature all individuals arc
identical in that theya ll embody their freedom in externalobj ects. From this presupposition
Lockedevelops hisequal right to appropriatenaturalobjects. However, thestateof nature
cannotbefully describedinterms ofequalityand identity,or as animmediatelypeaceful state,
that is,as a reconciliatio nwithout conflict. Humans arenot simplyequaland identical; there
arc Brelltdifferencesbetween individuals evenat a merelynatu rallevel. Considered in terms
of their ability 10own property (in Hegel 's terms as equal " persons") individualsare units
determinedincomradictiontoot bcnnirs: theyhavedifferent bodies, theycannot embodytheir
wills inthe sameobject. Thus in Locke'stheory of theduality of the stateof nature, on the
one hand. every individualisequal andfree toappropriateext ernalobjects,whileonthe other
hand. no willor property issecure fromotherwills. Because theidentityand equality of the
state ofnature isabstract, i.c., accountedforwithout referen ce toparticularity, it isunable to
overcome the differences present inthestateo fnaturc Theco mprehensionofdilferenee, i.e.,
peace , involves the medialion of disputes and it is only th is mediation which creates the
atmosphere Oflntst tha t makes possible the"social contrac t", Thus Locke' s argument is
insulTIci,.m because its account Ofpc.1CC presupposes a mediation ofdi lTerences yet fails to
account for thismediation
(2) The Moral \ViII lIS a Prcsuppesitlcn of Soci ety
liege!explicitly develops an account ofthe mediation required for peacefulcommunal
life. What is required in the first instanceis that the subject,although a particular individual,
be ;! le10willtheuniversal,that theuniversallaw notbeexternalto the particularsubject. In
ltcgcl'sview.thataparticulsr subjectconsciouslywilltheuniversalpresupposes thathe isself-
determined or free,that hecomprehcnds themereparticularity ofhis naturalbeing. For Hegel
the wholestandpoint ofobjectivespirilis beyondthedualismo fmindand nature; intheconcept
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of the free will, which Hegel's political philosophy everywhere presupposes, this dua lism is
understood as implicitly overcome. In the"Introduction" 10 the fltilQ.S.O.~ Hegel
recapitulates the argument oflus psychology that the free willk nows itselfimplicit lyns the
comprehensionof nature. Firstwe note that forHcgclthe willis a " thinking will" and thu ught
and will are not separate faculties. Rather for Hegel the will is a manner of thinking Andhe
describes it as thoughtdeterminingitsclftc existence.Hestaresthai inany activityofthc minl
bothmomentsare present ." Further for Hegelthe will is not limited by nature. Rather, the
will's relation to nature is the will's relation to its own particula rity and the distinction with
which wearc concernedis not between the willandnaturehut rath erlieswithinthe willitself;
adisparitybetweenwhatthe willisin its principleandwhatit isin itsdeed. WhenFosterspeaks
of such a divisionatthe standpoint of ethicallifeone wonders whether l iege!simplyforgot
oneof rhccentral features of hisown thought or whether Foster WIIS not entirelyacquainted
with the argumentof the " Introduction" to the£hi!.o.ro~.
I will develop the first presupposition of civil society, the freemoral will, through a
considerationof Hegel's conception orthe historical originof civil society. Modern civil
societyhasits originin the results of'the Protestant faith. Inquest inningthe Catholicchurch
whichheldauthorityinsacredmatte rs, LUIherdevelopedtheright ofindividualinsight, initially
asconcerned biblicalintc rpretatic n.!' This began the scculariz..arion of spirhunl resourcesas
one's relationship to God wasno longcr seen to be mediated by anothe rworldly,privileged
order. Hereafter theworld wasseen asthe preciselocusofman's spiritual activity. Marriage
wasno longerdeemcdless holythan celibacy, workwas deemed <Ivaluablespiritual activity,
and the moral validityof crafts and industrywas recognized,H
In England,thc"birthplace" of civilsociety,thisspirittook holdina criticismoft!wdivine
right of kings. In liberal theory, therefore,we findajustificationofacivi l soccry whichclaims
foritse lfmuch ofthc power of the state whichhad hitherto been claimed bytheking, In the
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writiogs ofl' homas Jlohbcs, forexample.thesovereigntyisjustified asthe unityofthepeople's
will." There is a limit to th e Hobbesianconception of the sovereign, however,because in it
thesovereignis nol atrue embodimentofthe moralwill of the subject. Thoughthe sovereign
isesrablishedby contract ofthe peopleand though they are obligate, ;;y his commands, the
sovereign agrees to no co ntract with the peo ple. T herefore there can be no breach of the
contrac t on his part." Mo reover, we might note that in Hobbes ' argume nt it is presupposed
thatthe sovereign hnsrhosc verycharacteristicswhichcanonlybe develo ped ina society,that
isle say that the sovereign is IIwill which.thoughparticular, can will the universal good.
In Locke's conception of civil society, sovereignty involves the moral will in a
dcmocraticfcrm. asacollection and compilationof the rights of the citizens. It is important
10note thnt in Locke'saccou ntof theslate of nature, the presupposi tion of thecontractis the
tmstaccnmplishcd inlimes ofpeace. ltis apparentthat this peacefu lunion and the mediation
it involves is an implicit for mof civil society. This is indicated in that individuals retain the
freedomofthcir natural co ndition evenwhen theyenter civilor po litical society. Further, this
Freedom fonns the limit o f all lcgislation. As James Doultargues:
...the moral will knows itself to be the source of the
socialo rdernnd isthedcmandthatit conformin general
toit s pr inciple.!"
Thc justiflcruionlor th e authority of'the political ordercomes to be seenasgrounded in
the morn! suhject and not in some divineright or external legisla tion. In liberal theories the
state is viewed as a means to individual freedomand as based o n contract andconsent. For
llcgclrhis representsan im plicit formof whm he calls Ihe "right of'thc subjective will", that
is, the subject's right 10 re cognize thetruth ora thing only in so far as it conforms to his
--------------------- - --- -
The furtherdevelopmen t oftile conceptof moral sovereignty is accomplishedinKantwith
urc cxplcit developme nt of the moral will which, though a particular will, wills the
universal interest.
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sub jectivity, so far as it embodies his inte rests."
Acco rding to Hegel, however, liberal theory docs nor adequ ately comprehend the
principle of subjectivity and it describes society only in terms of nbstrnct right. In llc gct's
argument, civilsociety reflects the transformation of this merely external or legalisticrightby
the concept of'thc moral will. According to Hegelabstract rightconcerns the activity of'the
free willonly in its approp riatio n ofexternal objects. WhClIllllYobj ec t is posscsscdbya Ilt~rSllll,
H egel argue s, it 15 transforme d from mere thinghuud uno propert y . Fur Il egel, front the
stand point ofth e free will, the object one will possess is arbitrary, one mig ht just as c"sily
ch oose a tree as a VCR . Beca us e the object possessed is not in nnyne cessary relation to the
p erson, he mayjus t as easily choose to give it away or se ll it, to aliena te it to anothe r pe rsun.
For Hegel, the sense of community which develops in acco rdanc e wilh the principles of
ab stract rig ht is based solely on merely legalistic o r formal prope rty transactions l ie algues
tha i at this stage the communal o r co mmon will has the II.1rm orlhe contract :uul is a mere
agreement between particular individua ls. li e slate s
In contrac t [however] the parties slill retain t hcir
particular will s; [and] con tract therefore is nol yet
beyond the stage o f arbitrariness, wilh the result tha t il
remains at the mercy crwrong."
For Hegel, the contrac t do es not in fact found a commun ity at all 1')111is merely a formal
uni on of still quite distinct, pa rtic ular individuals. The contract remains somewhat exter nal10
the individuals invo lved and it is there fo re a matt er of mere choice whether or northe y ahide
by its condit ions. Because ind ividua ls cannot be assured thai o thers w ill keep up their sldc of
th e barga in, there can be no trust and an y socialo rder so founded mu st cumbtc. All atte mpts
to preserve the soc ial order appear 10 be external to the individual's w ill and w ith no objective
or der which embodi es his freedom the re canbe no legitimate punishm e ntof w rongdoing , This
situatio n co rrespo nds to the "war of all against all" in Hob besian state-of- na ture acco unts . It
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isimpcnanr to note , howev er, that in J-lcgc1'saccount thisstar c orw er is no t a merely natur al
:;1811'. bUI springs from the contradiction involved when the free will has only a finite
embodimentin properly relations. IIegelcontends that at this levelof personality. when one
determinesone's freedominproperty, oneadopts the fonn ofparticularity and is brought into
conflict with other part iculars." In itself, abstract right can only establish a rationalistic
community based on mutual suspicion and under a rule ofl aw.
tutcnns of the moral principle, however, the law is no longer external to the subject.
Rather , the subject, turns inward because he cannot be satisfied byan objective o rder founded
on merelylegalprinciples. Inthis moral inwardnessheknowsa relationto a universalfreedom
which is mere than a systemof mere external arrangements, whichis, in fact, a relation to a
law he possesses withinhimsclf.
The moral will is reflected into itself and is aware of its freedom from all limitation.
However, because it is freefromlimitation, it remains indeterminate, the abstract formof all
willing, Therefore, according \0 Hegel, at the standpoint of morality, "subjectivity and
objectivity arc distinct from oneanother or united only by their mutual contradiction"."
This divisionof subject and object has two implications in Hegel's conception of the
moml will First, one' s particular desires appear to be external to one's inner freedom and
Inwardsell-reflection. According to Ilcgcl, this is the standpoint of the Kantian conception
of morality as a battleagainstinclination. In contrastwith the Kantianview,however, Hegel
docs 110t radicallyscpanucmoratuyand immorality. Ratherhe states,"thegeneral character-
istics of moralily uud immoralityalike reston the subjcctivitycf thcwill,"!' Because the moral
willissubject to no standard other thanitsownself-will,it mayjustaseasilywin itsownmerely
personal interests or the universalgood, the point being that there is no objectivecriterion to
decide which is which
For the logic of the contradiction which underlies the stare of war see~,
Section 92
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It isapparent that the response ofthc society at largc to the moral individualcannot itself
he moraland, therefore, the second form whichthe divisionofsllb jcci and object takes inthe
moral will is between the individual lind society. The subject can commit the 111051 heinous
crimeshut as long as he holdsthat his intentions arc good there is no moral basis I'm punishing
him. Society's responsecan then bebased only on merely pragmatic cousidcruuons such as
publicsafety, forexample.andno moralordercanbe actualizcd because Iheindividualremains
in a constant bailiewith thesocial order. Indeed for Ilegelit is impossible \0 imagine a social
order established on the basis of such a dichotomy.
The significance of civilsociety, indeed of the whole of'cthicalhfc including family and
stale, in Hegel's argument, is that it overcomes the externality of abstract right and the
limitationsofthe merelysubjective moralwill. Incivil soclctytbc moralwillfindsa rcahu which
is its own work. The principle of civilsociety is the actual unification of'tbc parriculurlntcrest
with the universal good and thus civil societyboth embodies and goes beyond Ihc principle of
morality as such, II is tile objective embodiment or tbc protestant work ethic. According 10
Hegel, through work, themoralsubject or iginates actual smndards anrlobjective relationsnnd
in developing these relationsovercomes t he abstractnessof merelysubjectivestandnrdsolTree
action . In civil society one linds this freedom present and actual in the life of lhe community.
Whereas the moral will as such is notor iously formalistic and destructive of'communal Iife, lIS
developed into an actual communal spirit it gains reality and fulfilmcnt.
Hegel wishes to demonstrate that in the exercise of his own inte rests, the individual is
necessarily dependent upon and implicated in the collective cxcrcise of' mnny othcr interests
A prime example of this is his analysis of'th c interdependence whichdevelops in the system
of need. According to Hegel. the fulli1mcntof the individual 's personal desires involves him
inwillingauniversalsocialorderas thccondhion under whichtheycanbe realized. Bycontrast
with the principles of abstract right and morality, therefore, civil so ciety is a union of tile
subject's inward freedom and the objective social realm
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Inother words civil society represents a transformation of abstract right bythe concept
ofthc moral will. The concept of private propert y is transformed. for example. No longer is
private property merely an externalembodiment of the wil l. Rather, it has become a means
for the enactmentof the demandsof moralityand it followsthat private property can nowbe
justified only so far as it furthers universal ends. Also crimes against person and property
become all the more serious because they infringe not only upon the part icular person but also
upon the universal interest. In the working of the system of need, class, and especially
cor porat ions it is shown that there is an essential reciprocity between the interests of tile
universalandthc personalinterestsof'individuals. The moralsubjectcanachievehisendsonly
in Ihc civil realmwhich he creates;onlythrough acting in accordancewith the conventionsof
:1specificdetcnninntcrealm canhe achieve his universal aims. It is also true, however, thai
the satisfaction of individual needsgives riseto a universal order. Fromone's immediate and
particularwork (c.g . thatof theindividual crallsman)oneisdrawnincivil societyto recognize
one's universalityas actualized. i.c.• to know it in customand law, The merelymoral subject
remainsa particularself-relatedwill. severedfromits own universality which isonly present,
subjectively.as an ought. Inethicalinstitutions, inthiscase thoseofcivilsociety, this"ought"
becomes nnvis"
(3) Family as a Presupposition of So cie ty
Hegel, furtherdevelopsthepresuppositionsof civilsocietyandaddresses the question
of'mcdiatiou, whichwasraisedabovewithregards to Locke'sth eory,' inhisconceptsoffamily
lite and love. In Hegel's account. the familyis presupposed byallexternal naturaland ethical
relations. Though family membersarc related to each other by birth or in a merely natural
• Sec above pp. 15-10
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manne r, in their eve ryday habits and cus toms tlll..-yknow an ethica l mediation ofdiffc rcnccs.
The family, therefore, is not a merely natural institution but is also an appropriate ethical
beginning inthat it shares the immediate starting point of abstract right (in tha t the subject is
confronted with a naturallimitwhich mustbe transformed) while atthe same lime providing
an objective ethical institution which can be recognized as grounding the subject's moral
freedom and as presupposed by such freedom.' 11 is presupposed by freedom, lirsl. in un
immediate or natural way. In infancy one is unable [0 look nflcr oneself lindtherefo re one's
existenceandwelfaredependsupon andis mediated by the concern of'others. Alsu. many of
theelements of'Iullblownethical life, which arc present in theSlate, are already present inthe
family. For example, there islegitimate authoritybased on two criteria: (i) the dependenc y of
theindividualor-childand(ii) thccxpcriencco f'thcparentswhohave traversedtheroutewhich
the child's development will take. Also, there is ethical education, laki'ig the form of'the
parent's practical examplc, religious or ethical indoctrination, and economicactivity in that,
inthe family, individualsarealsorelated intermsof'thcsatisfactionof need. Most importantly
the very individuality of the family membersis mediated bya relation to others, of child to
parent, husband to wife, and siblingto sibling. Through thcir life together husband and wife
become a unit, sharing all that they experience. Also as a child one's own self image is
determined by one's relation to one's parents. One's conscience is determinedby the moral
strictures of the parents and one feelsguilt when onecontradicts the parent's rules.
Asarguedabove, allmediationinvolves thenegationandcomprehensionoft he clements
involved. and we see ill the family, muchself-sacrificeand the emergenceof a primitive self·
discipline. Husband and wifearedisciplined in that they arc required to be monogamousand
for 811 family members incest is forbidden. It is thus the case that in family life the unlimited
power of choice is strictlylimited.
It is important to note in this context that for Hegel, human life is never merely natural.
cf~.Section24.
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This effectsa severecriticismof the liberal assumption that the frecindividuality upon
whichcivilsocietyrests issomethinggivenandunrnediated as in stale -or-nature accounts. In
J-Icgel'saccount theindividual freedomwhichis the foundationandjustificationofcivilsociety
and state is not merely given but rather has been mediated by interio rizing the culture and
discipline offamily life. The individual is ethically educated prior to his capacity for full self-
conscious moralaction. hiswillis disciplinedby a concrete ethicalinstitution equippedwith
force. authority.and legitimacy. Naturallawand self-interest, the comer-stonesofsta te-of-
nature accounts, are comprehended by the family unit which includes not only selfish
individualsbutindividualsdevotedtootbers. Inthefamily,therefore.themediationofselfand
other, which can only bedemandedfrom the moral standpoint, is already implicitlyaccom-
plishedin the feeling of lovewhichfamilymembershave for eachother.
Thefamilyis, however, a limitedformofethical lifebecauseindividualscannotdevelop
to theirfull potentialso longas theyremaindependenton theirparents: andthepurposeofthe
familyis to developthe individualityofchildrento the pointwherethey eanleavetheir merely
natural rclnticnsbehind" Childrendevelopand leavetheir naturalfamilyinorder to make a
lite forthcmsclvcs,andethicnl lifeinitsimmediateunionofuniversalandpartlculerendeisthus
sundered into a situation where the individual defines himself in contra-distinction to the
universal." Accordingto Hegel, thefurther development of individualitytakes plaeein civil
society, which he calls "ethical life in its stage of division" because in it the individual
subordinates the universal good to his own private interests." The family unit dissolves
through the workingof the principleof individual personalityand in civil societyindividuals
lire treated not as loved family membersbut as independent persons related to each other
-_. _._. _._._._-_._-- - -- - - - - - -
Itisimportantto notethatforHegel thelimitof thefamilyisexprcssedinthiscontradiction,
thnt the very individuality it develops leads to the dissolution of the family. Cf.~
Philosophyof RighI, Pars. 177& 181.
•• This divisioncrunlversal and particular interests is presagedin teenage rebellion where
childrendefine themselves by contradictingtheir parents.
thrcugh self-interest and law"
The presupposition ofcivilsociety is thus an individualwhose desires and actions arc
already implicitlyuniversal and the wholemovementof civilsociety. in Hegel's argument, is
the education of'the individualfromand throughhis isolatedmdividunlhy 10a recognition of
II moreuniversalperspective. Unlikethe familywhereintcrcstsof'thcunivcrsaland particular
interests of individual family members arc united in an immediate natural unity, in the
movement of civil societythere is a developmentof individual frccdcm nndethicallite such
thatobjective institu tionsareseentobeproductsoft lieindividual'swill. Illdividtmisarerelated
to others byvirtue of thechoices they make, not because they lireborn inrothcsc relations as
in the family:
Incivilsociety, however. there isnevera full reciprocitybetween individualandsociety
or between the subjective andtheobjective realms. Theinstitutionsof civilsocietynppearto
individuals as mere external authorities or conversely as meansto lite individualspersonal
satisfaction. The universalgoodand particularinterestsareunited only inso far as the subject
is subjugated to the universal or in so faras the universalis merelyII means to the realization
of the subject' s wishes. In his reflection on civil society the individual knows that his
individualityis dependent on the willof others. In making this interrelationan object for
thought and in willing Ihis lntcr-rclarlonhe givesit a rationalform. According 10 Ilcgcl, the
state is this explicitlywilled rational formofhuman inter-relation and its veryinstinnlnns arc
established as the objective expression of this inter-relation of subjects, thus as II thorough
union of subject and object.
It is also important, however, to keep in mind thai the habits of cooperation and
consideration developed in the family arc also presupposed by civilsociety. This serves
to stress Hegel' s point that in civil society we do not begin from a standpoint of raw
individuality.
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CHAPTER THREE
HEGEL'S ANALYSISOF CIVIL SOCIETY
Accordingto Hegelanindividual'sparticularacts are embodiments off-isfreedom, not
simplyofhispersonalfreedom(freedomof'choicc or freedomfromobstruction)but ofa more
universal freedo m, mediated by consciousness of law and community. In developing its
potentialities,Hegelcontends,particularity passesover into universalityandattainsits right."
The process of civil society is thus an education of the part icular individual from hisown self-
interest to amoreuniversalethicallife, thcdcvclopmcntofthe implicituniversalityofthemoral
wiILl -' Through the course of this education, the individual is soc ialized and his talents,
personality.and habits take on a social character.
Hegel' s argumentdevelopsintwoways. Onthe one hand,hecontends that through the
interaction of self-interestedindividuals and the interplay of individual and social interests a
"spontaneous"stmcturingorthisinter-relationoccurs. It followstherefore,that the structures
ofcivilsocietyare in fact, embodimentsoft hesubject's free will. Onthe otherhand,heargues
that the structureswhich developserveto discipline the particularity oft he subject's interests
so that they become universalized,and further rather than contradict the interests of the
community.
(I) The Syst em of Needs
Contraryto Foster's claims,for Hegel, the individual with whichwe are concerned in
civil society is not simplyau isolated naturalsubject,bound to impulse,but is rather, a self·
conscioussubjectrelated to his own appetites as a freememberof a community. For Hegel,
the subject's relation to desireand appetite is therefore not opposed to reason but is, in fact,
detcnnined by reason; and his needs arc not satisfied through merely natural objects but
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th ro ugh the "artificial" prod ucts of hurnanaction . In the inte r-relatio n with th e IK'Cdsoro tbers.
one's own needs becomeabstract 85 one multipliesone's needs and the meansofl\c:.:.;:..ing
th em in relation 10 others, Also. one sets up a hierarchy of needs in ter ms o f e nds and means;
certainneedsarc no longerdesiredsimplyinthemselvesbut inso far asIheycontribute to some
furthersatisfaction. This establishesa ~nrnt of needs whichconsistsof rauonnlized social
structures whose goal is the satisfaction of the needs of particular individuals. This
muhlpllcatlon c r nccds and means makes any single need inlo "one 8I1long.I1I11IlY" and lessens
its importance and immediacy.
In civil societyhumans giveanexplicitly rational formto their needsanddcsire«, In the
placeof naturaldesires we create our ownsecondnature, our appetites lindconsumptionnrc
notlimited to the productsofnature and,infact, for the most part WCCO IlSUlIlC the products
ofhumanwork. Indeed ourparticulardesiresarc oUcnonlymeansto more socialdesiressuch
as the desirefor status. Thereforeit is terribly abstract to describeour appetites as given by
nature. Human desiresare, for the most part, produced throughsocial interaction, likewise
the objectsof desire arc produced by society and the value of theseobjectsis determined by
human labour." In the systemof needsboth the objects desired and the meanslor achieving
themare throughand through the productof human activity. When wepurchaseII chair it is
not the wood we want but woodformedfor comfort andconvenience,even beauty. For the
mostpart we do nOIsimplygo back into the woods andcut down an oak tree, for example.
We go to shoppingmallsand furniture stores, boutiques andantique-shops, wepay casu or
usc credit cards, and purchase covers and spraysto protect what we buy. Thus our desires
and the meansto their achievement cannot be describedas merely"natural", theybelong to
a complexwcb of socialand commercial interactions,' Whenone's needs arc multiplied(Inc
Though certain needs remain given by nature they are drawn into the web of social
interrelations. We stillneed food, for example,but implicitin each meal of beef are Ilu:
Genco!!AgrcemcO! on TariffsandTrade,variousmarketingboards,a hostofgovcmmcnt
subsidies, not to mentionthe labourof farmers who may livethousands
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ismoredependent on othersforone's satisfactionand the subjectis thussomewhatliberated
fromthe particularity ofhis will. The fact that in one's own work andself-interested activity
one producessatisfactionforothersmakes reference to the needs ofothersessentialto one's
private conduct. Even one's desires aredetermined by the latest fashionand in theinterestof
status. According 10 Hegel, however, the intellect, as well as desire, is educated in the
workplace. lie contends thatone encounters numerous situationsandopinionsinthis realm
and that the responseto these complexrelations generates new ideas and mental flexibility.
AI~o onedcvclopsa practicalattitude throughworkand, asHegelargues,the endofpracticaJ
education is the "habh ... of objectiveactivityand universal1y recognizedaptitudes".'7One
learns to he busy, to work in accordancewithsocialstandards, to get alongwith co-workers,
basicallytoget thingsdone. OverandagainstFoster's view,in Hegel' sconcept ofcivil society
we arc not dealingwith individualsisolatedby the particularity of their needs and brought
togetheras a mereexternalcollectionof'particulars. Ratherwe are concerned withmembers
ora community whose actionsserve universal, social interests.
/l.s argued above, the presuppositionof civil society, in Hegel's argument, is the free,
moralsubjectand nonhe-crcuu rco rdesirc"asinFoster's state-of-natureaccount. It follows
that intcrmsof thisuniversal,moralsubjectivity.it ismerelyanabstractionto speakofa radical
distinctionbetween thedifferinginterestsofindlvidunls. Theabstractionfromtheimmediacy
nfnced and thedevelopmentora systcmofnecdactualizesthe moralsubject'scomprehenslon
ofhisrelation10 nature; it isanobjectiveexpressionof his liberation fromthegivennessof this
relation. Thusfor Hegel,thesigoiflcancc ofcivilsocietyis thatinit individuals findsatisfaction
onlyin relationto other Irecindividunls, thathumanactionisessentiallymoral lindcommunnl,
or whnt hc callst'cthical". He stales:
Thisrelationofwill10 willis thetrueandproperground
inwhichfrecdomisexistcnt."
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Thisimplicitrelationorwill to willis, forHcgct.thc foundationof'thcmostbasicsoclo-
economicinteraction in civil society, the "contract" Comparedto the natural recognition
present in the family, the contract is an abstract recognitionin that individualsnrc brought
together not in termsot'love andfor the purposeof theirspiritualdevelopmentbut solelyin
terms of propertyrelations In civil societyhowever, we nrc concernednot simply whhthe
rights of individuals in their abstract particularity (as in the case of "legal rights")bul of
infinitely self-reflectedsubjects whoknowtheir identitywith the universal interests orsocicty
andwho implicitly willthis identity."Thcindividual's purposesarcthussocialiuchuracrerand
the socialor universal aspectof hispurposeexpressesitseif as Ihe desire10be likeothers. to
emulate othersand10beequal to them. TheD.lilIlllkI ofpcrformlugan actgainsinImportance
andone becomesconcernedwithethers' opinionsof oneself and one's work as opposed 10
their propertyrelations as such.
In relation to the multiplicationof needsandtalentsonecomesto be recognizedsocially
only in so faras one works in the satisfaction of one or another of these needsand inso lin
as one's specialskillin this work meetssocialstandards. This actuates a diYimuuu:tlUo.Ul
whichenhancesthe objectivityof'thcsystemofnccd and deepens universal interdependence
Hegel states
...byadia lecticaladvancesubjectivcsc1f-seekinglurns
intothe mediationorthc particularthroughthe univer-
sal, with the result that each man in earning lind
producinglindenjoyingon hisown account is !:Qj12SJ.l
producingfor the enjoyment of everyoneelse."
Thercsultingobjccnve, socialorgnniz..ationlscomposcdof two clements:(i) Auniversal
or common possession of general resources and skilled labour and (ii) Class division.
EthicallifeisnOI developedinits fulluniversalityas tbctrueendofsociallifeincivilsociety
where il remains implicit and consists only in the mclaDge of mutual dependencieslind
opportunitieswhichthe enterprisingindividual assumes.
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"Commoncapital", general resources etc., is a simpleenough concept. However wemust
explicate Hegel's concept of classdivision sincethis issue is notoriouslycontroversial
Hegel argues that individuals partake inuniversal institutions and common capital by
means of their own skills and resources. These are not simply personal attributes and
acquisitions.however,becauseoncattains one'sownresourcesonlyin relationtoouers, and
furtherbecauscw hat actunllycountsasskillisdeterminedby what isvaJued inthecommunit) .
For Hegel,the basisof the classsystemis that theindividualbe related to society byvirtue of
the particular skills and theoretical and practicaleducation auaine d by himself and his family.
Inthis systemthe individualattainshis position insociety in termsof tile actualcircumstances
of'his life and his ability to perform socially recognized work,
The conjunction of panicular skilland the universal will (the social willof particular
individuals) isdetermined as an objective conglomeration of individuals in terms ofthe work
lhey do, i.e., class divisions. TIle development of such objective classes is a necessity .
accordingto Hegel, but hearguesthat"the waysand means ofsharingcapitalare leftto each
n"1n ' :spar1icular cho icc" andthattheciasscsarethe rootwhich "connectS~lo lhe
univcrsal".40 • Theimponantaspectofclassdivisionis that, init, tbeels aunityof theuniversal
interest with the pan icular intercst. The objectiveorder upholds subjectivepanicularity and
converselyrhcuniversal is instantiated inthe particular intentions of the subjective will. One
satisfies one's particulardesires by adapting oneself to the customsof one's class andto the
skills required in civil society, and by cooperatingwith one' s co-workers
In thesatisfaction of self-interest, therefore, individuals also give birth to an objective
order which in tum educates thembeyond their isolated self-interest and disciplines them in
thencedscf'theccnuuunity. Oneis recognized not asa merely privatepersonbutas amember
ofaclassandinorder to actualizeone' spurposes(whichmeans to havethemrecognized)one
must limil oneself to a particular trade, profession, or vocation. It is impona nt to note,
.. ..- ---_. _-_ ._-- - - - - - - - - - - -
however, that individuals arc not simply bound 10 a particular class l iege! argues that by
contrastwithPlato's argument inlhe~, whcrc vthcnllotmcmof individuals to ctasscs
wasledto the rulingclass". in thc modernworldtheclasssystemwhichdevelopsorncccsslty
in civil societyand the state is also broughtabout by the activity orthe arbitrary will." In
Hegel's analysis. an individual chooses whichclasshe willbelong to in accordance with the
ski1Js and mannershedevelops. Further,th e formsof'cornuumallifcwhichdevelop in civil
society are not meant to determine completely tile individual's ethical life; for llcgcl,
communityis foundedon farmore than needandeconomic relations. Theclass systemis not
to be valuedinandofitsclfbut ratherasan appearanceor prefigurationofthc ethicallifewhich
isonly fullydeveloped in the state
Hegel recognizes the limits of the class system and he argues thaI adjustment and
correctionnrcto be undertakenby thegovernment. He stares thnt classesarc superseded hy
and undergomodificationthrough the workingof civil law,theadministrationorjuslice,t hc
processof education,and religious instruction:': Therefore one's relationto society is not
whollydeterminedbyone's relatlonto one's class. Onemustkeepinmind, however,thatone's
class and occupation imply a certain peculiardiscipline and experience of lile. it certain
education.' For example,whatoneought todo isdeterminedrelativeto one's classand one's
interestsaremediatedbyone's class. Thereforecontraryto Foster's argulllent.t he mdividual
can know whatheought to do without renouncingthc, .onomicwill." In fact the importan t
point for Hegel is that civil society(thcvcconomicrealm" as FOSler callsit) is a definite form
Hegel's term for this education is lli.!.d.unY whichhas the broad connotation of ethical
developmentof the individual'sconsciousnessof fhclawsandcustomswhichgroundhis
communallife, This is not an educationgained simplyin school though it may be partly
gainedtherc. Rather for Hegel it isaneducationwhichone undcrgoesthrough communal
interaction: throughwork. lifeexperience, family,art and science.forexample Atthclcvcl
ofcivilsocietyeducation occurschieflythroughworkand thecommunal interactionstied
toit
.. sec p. 12 above
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of self-conscious ethical life In the "education" which occurs in the system of needs, the
activity of the subject is to develop the implicitcustoms of't his realm in order that they may
beknown. This reflectionuponcustomis, inthe firstplace, rectitude or knowing theattitudes
and behaviour appropriate to one's class, The identity of particular and universal interests
is relative inthe classdivisions, however, andindividualsarc more than merely class-beings.
For example, they maymove from oneclass to another. Further. individuals fromdifferent
classes come into direct relation to each other, as the system of needs engenders an
interdependence of class, and it becomesnecessary10know the customsof many different
classes if one is 10 work incivil society.
(2) Th e Admi nistration of J ustice
Inthisinterdependence ofclassesandinvirtueofthe freedom....-ithwhich theindividual
may moveamongdifferentclasses, the personwhoreceives thiseducationin the systemof
needs isconsciousofparticipatinginanorderwhichgoesbeyond theparticular classto which
he belongs. Accordingto I lcgcl this "classlcssncss'' is at the basis of the administration of
justice: everyoneisseen to be equal and one's rights are recognized. not in virtue of one' s
class,but invirtucofunivcrsalpersonhood. Righttherefore. hasuniversalvalidity(il belongs
to cvcryonc) andinlawit isgivendeterminateexistenceforconsciousness." Fromitsdivision
nun individual personsand distinct classes,civil society reasserts its unityand universality
throughthe systemof law. Hegel slates:
Intheadministration ofjusnce...civilsocietyreturns10
its concept.to the unity of the implicit universal with
thesubjective particular...... •
11 is important to note lila! thisunity is accomplishedonlyat the expenseof the personal
iutcrcsts ofthcindividual
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T his unity has primarily two marnfcstarions
First. the particular conventions and interconnections brought about by the 1\CCCSS:l l)'
dynamic oft hcsystemofnccdarc raised10 the levelor sctr.consctousncss inthesystemof'law
Custom is made into a system in which the subject recognizes his ow n universal reason
Second. becausethc univcrsal Jawis detcrrninatcnnd actualin thissphere, l hc ri~h l ofintcutiun
is givenobjectivestandards bywhich it canjudge action. The universal ismade objective IiII'
conscio usness in positive law and is fur:.herdetermined by its applicationto the dCI:lilsof'civil
and family Jifc.
It isevidentfromthefirst argumentthat contraryto Fosler's contcmton.Hcgctdocsnot
have a Ull.is:maful co nception of civil law, Rath er, iu tlcgcrs conccptiun. civil law is not some
"ab stract cnd-ln-itsclfvbutarises from the particularcustoms and appet ites ur npeopl e. Hegel
sees law as produced in the actual lire of a people such that it cannot pnssihly be ded uced a
QL:i2ri as Fcster sugg csts." In the system of'lnw. thc subjcct know s a rCilso llll lill is ,Kll I;11 i11IlJ
determinate in thc community and the social relations, which remain implicit in mere custom s.
now assume an explicit and indep endent rea lity which stands over aud ngains rthe ind ividua l's
merely part icularimcrests.
Fr om the second argum ent il is evide nt thai whereas , from thc moral slantlpoinl,
intention is merely subjective . in the admin istration c f'jusnce , becaus e the laws arc fwhlid zed
and social custom and manners are recognized, inten tion is subject to objective sumdards . The
limit or formality of moral intent ion co nsist s in the facrthnt il cunne r distinguish m uh frum
er ror; tha t il canno t de termine whether its act is the produc t of'n nnivc rsal will for the good
or merely the product ofits own self-interest . In a society whose customs have been raised
to the objecti vity o f positive law, insight hits the objective ri!(hl 10 insight ir un wlm! is
recognized as right. " o y cont ra st with Foster ' s po rtrayal, it is essential to Jlegcl's argument
Also Foster treats Hegel's concept ofthc slat e as ame re logica ldeduc tion, For 11 discussion
of th e misconception invo lved in this v iew sec Cha pter Five
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thai civil Jaw is willedami actualizedby the self-conscious subject. In fact, for Hegel, the
atabcrity of the system of justice lies in the recognition by individualsthai their personal
interestscan be realized onlyin a universal order.
Further, inthesystemoflaw, particularcrimestakeon a universalandobjective aspect.
According to Hegel the law is self-subsistent and objective; it is universally known and
recognizedas legitimate;andilisapplicable tuparticularindividualsand circumstances." Also
in our considerationof thesystem of law weare no longer dealing, as in abstrac t right, with
isolated individuals bUI with membersof an objective,social whole. Therefore,when one
infringes upon the rights of a particular party one also infringes upon the rights of the
whole societyandweare concernednot simplywith the particular individuals involvedin the
crime butwith the universal interest of societywhich is injured in the breachof law. In civil
society, therefore, retributionis no longer a matter ofindividual revenge,or ofmerefeeling
and particularity, as it is in a purelyabstract conceptof right. Rather, punishment isenacted
on thcbasis of theself-conscious application ofuniversally recognized statutesand it thushas
a universal form, Moreover, Hegelargues that because lawis positiveand individuals have
been educated to objective social standards, the intentionsof lin agent canbe determinedby
any educated person. He states that the agent can have faithin the judgment of hispeers (In
trial byjury) becauseof "the similaritybetween them in respect ofth eir particularity, that is.
their social position, CIC" ."
For Hegel the purpose of punishment is 10 purge the criminalof his abstraction or
alienation fromconcrete ethical life andto return him to a proper relation to the community.
0 11 thesubject iveside the criminal,sofaras he recognizesthewrongnessofhis crime,regains
his rightful place in the communityand on the objectiveside, the universal systemoflaw is
dcrcnnincdas comprchcnsiveofpanicularbreacheswhichare shownto bemere nullities. The
so calledrights which persons have in their isolation from one another, as in state-of-nature
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accounts, are show n by Hegelto be untenab le because they RfC mere abstractions.' In the
administrationof juslice.concrete institutions areestablishedwhtchasscrt thcco nccprcr right
over and against individuals in their isolation fromeach other.
There are, however,two significant limitations to the administrationof juslice. First,
it remains in a certainsense only a relative unification of universal and particular interests
because, though it bringsallindividualsunder therule or law,it tendssomewhat10 defendthe
individual'suniversalinterestsasagainst his merelypersonalinterests. For example. onemay
need shoes but law, strictly speaking, willnot provide you withthe means for obtainingshoes.
Second, because theactualityorthe unionof universal andparticularendsoccursonlyinsingle
casesofinfringemcntofthe law,justiccisnot a thoroughgoingunityofuniversaland particular
rights. Againif one needsshoesthc lawwillonlybe involved ifone attempts to stealthemor
ifsomcone unduly hindersone's attempts to obtain them. h is apparent that contrary 10
FOSler's view,the universalwhich Hegelargues isunconsciousin civil societycannotbe civil
law. Hegelexplicitlydemonstratesthelimits of civillawand showswhythemovementofcivil
society istowards a moreconcrete universal. towards aneducationof the individualsuch thai
herecognizesin a rnoreexplicitformthat the willoft hccourts ishisown will, For Hegel. lhal
the subject recognize the courts as a determination of his own freedom presupposes Ihe
existenceof the state,
(3) P ublic Authority and Corpora t ion
It isthe demand of the subject thathis concrete freedom, the unily of his universal and
particular ends. be actualized in a stableand continuous manner. This unity is extended
throughout the realmof civil society Ihrough two institutions: the public authorityand the
, See f..B.., Pars, 102, 102.A, and 220, for Hegel's conceptof revenge.
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corporation
According to Hegel,thepurposeof the public authority is 10be a middle term between
the individualand thecommon goods and opportunities which societyaffords. One of the
duties orthc public authorityis to maintain thecommon capital and general utilities." Also
the publicauthorityisconcerned withquality control and pricefixingof essentialservicesand
goods . Ilegel argue that "goods in absolutelydaily demand are offered not so much to an
individual115suchbutrathertoIIuniversalpurchaser, thepubl i c.'~ Thepublicauthorityinsures
that Ihe public is notdefraudedor takenadvantage of byparticular interests. However even
lawful actions may interfere with the freedom of others and Hegel contendsthat the public
authorityalsoattempts to removeaccidental hindrances to the rights of the individualand the
pubfic."
Further the public authority is responsible for the management of the dispossessed
classes, 10 ensure thatthe disparitiesofthe systemof needsdo not infringe theuniversalright
to partake in the common good. For Hegel, withthe extravaganceof the freemarket there
isnecessarilyan impoverishment orthoscwho forreasonsofluckorabilitycannotpartakefully
in the market. As members of civil society, they are encouraged to actualize themselves
through work yet theyare prevented from this by the very system which encourages the
desire.SI Becausethcdisposscssed cannotfullypartake inthebenefitsand opportunitiesofcivil
society, they feel this limitation as a resentment of those who have more and whose
disproportionatewealthis one cause of their poverty." Inthis contradiction, the members of
the dispossessed classes arc len out ofsociety asa wholeand do not find their freedomin its
lawsandcustoms,whichappcarmerclytoinstantiate theaforementioned contradiction. Hegel
argues that thc publicauthorityattempts to preventvice from breeding amongthis classand
to secure the welfare of its members."
T hc individual's isolation or alienation fromsocietyis no longer considered as rooted
solely in the individual's willnor can it be explained 8S a problem of the individualwill.
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Alienation becomes a class problem and whe n a class as a who le is prevented fro m fully
enjoyingthebenefitsofsociety, its individual memberscan findrecognition onlyso far liS they
arcthemselvesalienatedfromsocietyandacton Ihebasisoflhisalienation" Onlyif one'sclass
is liberated from opposition to the whole can an individual be liberated tu the classless
standpoin lofj usliccnnd loparti cipalioninthe bronderi ntcresIso ft hcwholcsocicly . Likewise
justice can attaintrueuniversalityonlywhen classprejudices can be overcome.
In its relations to business, to the dispossessed class, and to individuals, t he rublic
authority protects individual interests onlyso farasthey havea relation to thecommon good,
sofar as theyare related10theuniversalcommunityof civilsociety. The publicauthorityhas
as its purpose the actualization of thc universal contained within the particularities of civil
society. lnthisactualization,however. theuniversalends ofsocietyaredctennincdin nmerely
external organizationwhose activity is mostly the prevention of hindrances to particular
satisfaction. On theone hand, the publicauthoritymediates between the variousindividual
endsin orderto maintaintheirharmony, thoughstillonly intheinterest of individuals. Onthe
other hand. individualswilltheir own personalendsand thecommonend primarilyas a means
to these ends.
In orderto overcome the limitsof thepublicauthority,where thecommongood remains
ina somewhat externalrelationto individual interest,thecommongood mustbegiven amore
objectiveform. Themostobjectiveformwhich acommongood generatedfromself interest
cantake, accordingtoHegel.Isactualizedinthecorporation. Inthecorporation,Ilegelargues,
therelationof the particularworker to theuniversalorganization ismediatedbyhis particular
skill.T he purpose of'theindividual's activityandof'thc activityoffbc corporation. however.
isone and Ihe same, that is, thesatisfactionofthe individual,thoughat this stageas a collective
enterprise. In thiswaythe purposeormecorporetton is thoroughlyconcreteand a reciprocity
I n i t s ext reme lhc"solid;ri ty ofth;di~ ~;cd~;P;-~~~~s-~ri;~~ Ifnnc's pecrsa ndfamlly
are criminals thelikelihood that one will alsobe a criminal is high.
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is established between a universal good and the particula r interests ofindividua1s; only so far
the ind ividual coo perates with others and adheres to the co nventions of the workp lace can he
find his sat isfact ion, and only through the efforts of particu lar individuals. in th e satisfaction
of their needs,can sucha systemand education be developed." In the corporationit is not
simply the case that theparticularsubject mustwilla universal good which is stillimposed in
asomewhatexternalmanner;ratherthecorporationisa universalinstitutionalwillwhich more
directly engages the particular interestsofits members. Though the corporationis exacting
in its discipline.educatingits members10requisite levels of skilland habit. it alsoprotects its
members. Hegelarguesthat theccrpcrationrestrictsunlimitedearnings,rationalizesthe form
of charity. and actualizesthe right to welfareofits members."
The corporation is the mostconcreteinstitutionof civil society. In the system of
needs for example,oneaccomplishes one's own welfare and only subsequently, bycompul-
sion, contributes to thesatisfection of thewelfareof others. In thecorporation one wills the
satisfactionof othersaswellasoneself andrecognizesthat one's particular satisfaction is the
product andend not only ofone's own will, but alsoof the willof others. Under the system
of justice the standards whichmust be respected in the relation to these others has been
determinedbut in the corporation the moments of civil society. of right and welfare, are
united." Farther. the union of particularinterestsand universal interestsis more concrete in
the corporation than in the systemofjustice. Here, it isnot simplya matter of an application
ofthc universal to theparticularor a merelyrelationalunion. Rather,forHegel.thetrue union
of'thc subjective and the objectivewill is implicit in the corporation.
It isplainfronuhc preccdingaceountthat it isquite problematic to arguethatHegelsees
civil society liS an economicrealmin thesenseofa realm of activityrestricted exclusively to
the satisfacnon of material desires. Rather, for Hegel, civil society is an education of the
particular will to a consciousness of its universalground. The universalityof the moral will
isdeveloped in concrete institutionsand relationsand is rid ofits abstractness.
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Also,given that clvillawis but a moment inthcdcvclopurcm ofciviJsociety, it is dillicult
to credit the view that it is only if one renounces the economic will and (Quarationalist)wills
the civil law as an end in itself that one is transformedinto anethical agent . l iege! arguesthat
the corporation is a more concrete ethical institution than the court of law and. Iar from
requiring that the subject renounce the "economic will", the corporation actualizes the
subject's right to welfare.to a livelihood.
Consequently,for Hegel. the economicrelations ofcivilsocietyarc essentiallyethical,
they-develop the subject's objective duties and overcome abstract moral reflection. T he
unco nscious movement of civilsocietyisto developu niversaland freerelations amonghuamns
who recognize and respect each other, who share customs, laws and history. 11is a diajccrlcal
development, where the individual, originally unconscious or the necessity of sublating his
particu larity and relating to others as equal to himself and necessary to his freedom. is raised
to a consciousness ofthish isuniversality. Bycolilrastwith rosier'sllnlllysisorthe~
~,Hegel's actual conception of civil society d oc s not accept the division of et hicaland
economic life. The whole 8i;1 of hisargument is that objective social institutions arc the
embodiments ofthe moral will, that morality is not an abstract system of precepts but rather
a living system offreedom which exists only in the actions o f real human com munities.
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CHAPT ER FO UR
FOS TEI{'S CIUTIQUE OF TilE IIEGELIAN STATE
Foslerargues that therecan beatransition from civilsociety to thestate only ifHegel
accepts thePlatonicnotionofa"philosopher-king". Thetransitiontocivilsocietycanbemade.
hecontends, onlyffHegel establishesaclass division betweenthosewho know theideaof the
slate (itseternal core) and whothus consciouslywill the universal,and thosewho willonly
particular ends and who thus cannot know the true idea of the slate. Those who will the
universal, Foster says, partake in what Heg elcallsethical life~)and it is tbeir task
to in-formthose who arc merely caughtup in their particular interests. This in-formationis
the act by which the cla ss of philosophcr-kings rules over its subjects. Philosopher-kings
impose onthe subjectsan intelligibleform whichthe subjects do not have and whichthey are
incapableofgivingtothcrnsclvcs. It isthus theactivity ofruling whichwilldistinguishthestate
from civilsociety, which will necessitate the existence era realmof greater universality than
thai of civilsociety,and a class of rulers whichpresides over a class which is ruled.
Moreover. Foster attempts to show the basis of what he believes to be Hegel's
totalitariantendencies. I-Ie argues thatHegel's concepts of the ideal stateand of historydo
not allow for any real activity of thehuman will and that in subjugating historicaltime to
eternity, andthe real(historical) st ateto its eternalcore, Hegeldenies thatwhichisessential
to freedom:that there is a contingencyin the realm ofhumanactivity which enablesthe will
to net subject 10 no necessity. The implicationof this argument is that the heart of Hegel's
concept ofpracticalspirit isthesubjugation ofindividualfreedomto the authorityof the slate.
This rejecti onof an eternal rationalorderof po litieaI life has becomea corner-stoneof
liberal thought . Communities it is argued. are ordered byconsent, law, andtradition, each of
which arisesin the ccnnngcm self-enactmentsof individuals and is not to be considereda
necessarydevelopment . From th isstandpoint, substantive fr eedom be yondthe contingen t nets
of individuals is II mer e idea to which idealistsattemptto forec facts to conform. For Fostcr,
humans are free, not in confo rmity to any obje ctive idea l nor in so r., r as they realize any
supposed ra tional o r real self. The notion of an eternal, objective political order whi ch is
beyond the individual and to which he must contbrm, will thus appear to Foster as an
authori tarian subjuga tion of the individual's will.
Foster 'sargument, howe ver, depends upon a mlsrep rcsentmio nofHcg cl'sthoughl. l ie
foists his own dichotom ies of eternal and tempor al, willand reason , individual Bud slat e, UJIOIl
Hegel 's argument In this cha pter t will summarize Foster's argument thatllegcl cannot
develop a concept of the free will because his doctrine of the stale rests on a platonic
metaphysics which subjugates lime to eternity, the "rcal" slate to an "ideal" state, and the
citizen to the ruler. L ater, in Chapters Five and Six, I ho pe to show thnt Fosler' s argument
misrepresen ts Hegel ' s political philosophy because it fails to consider the dialectical narureof
such terms as "the cu nningof reason", "passion" , "ideal a nd real", "lliWlJ.IlY" , and " govern-
ment" .
(1) Hegel's "Platonism"
ro ster contend s that Hegel 's philosophy is limited in that it fhilsrc transcend fully the
platonic met aphysics . In Fo ster's view, Hegel is thus le d to an acceptance of thc platonic
division of the state into classes which differen tiate ruler and rule d
For platonists, the state is a "t imeless pro cess" whi ch is not manifested in any actual
entity.' The clements or-stages orthcstatc have a mere logicahclatlon,that is to say, theyexist
FOSler doesn' t b other to discuss the obvious difficult y ofaco ncepto f a timeless process .
that is, how there is process or movement with out tim e, becau se hebelieves this concept
to be merely a spurious idea, something merel y conjured in t hought
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innorea l relatio n .~7 Fer example,Posrcrcontends that inHege l's accou nt "abstract right" and
"civil society"are mereidealizations andrefer tono cityorstate thatever existed. Conceived
asa timelessprocess, the stateis thought to be realizedorcompleted logically priorto time.
Fo stercontrasts Hegel's view ofthe stare10 that of Hobbes and arguesthat whereas
Ilabbes viewsthe stareas theartificialproduct of a sovereign, Hegel. becauseheviews the
stateas logically realizedandthereforetimeless,"revertsto the Greek doctrine thatthe state
isnaturaL ."SI W henFoslerargues thai Hegelconceivesthe slateas natural he meanslittle
moreby it thanhe docsby timeless;hesimplywishes to assert thatin Hegel's viewthe state
is neithermadenor created. Foste r states, however, that Hegel introducestwo significant
modilicationsor the Greek view, the concepts of"organism" and"evolution".
To co.rtruc Ilegel' s conceptionofthe stateas organic is tosay thatthe life ofthe state
consistsin thedom inationcrrbewholeovertheactio n ofitsmembers. Inanorganism,Foster
stales, the essence of'cachof'thcmembersis relative to thewholeand it isonly inperforming
itsproper functionthatthe organ canrealize itsown perfection." Though Foster does not
dearlystale how thisview marksa developmenton platonictheory,he implies thatwhereas
platonistsseethe ruleras dominating thesubjects,in Hegel' s conception ofthe stateno single
clement hasabsolutedominion. Foster states:
Nosinglcpowerinthestateisthesourceofsovereignty
any more than the health ofa bo dy isa function ofa
single organ withinit.w
T he second modification of the platonic conceptionof'the stateas anatural unitywhich
Fostera ttributes to Ilegel isthe notionof natural developmentorevolution. For Hegel not
onlylsthe statetimelessand logicallyrealized, it isthe endofan historica l teleologicalprocess.'
Thus forFoster thercrms'uatorar', "organic"," timeless". "teleological","evolution" . and
"realized" arc notused inn particularlytechnical manner. Rather theyare anattempt by
FOSler todisti nguish what he sees tobe Ihe"determinism" ofHegel's idealistconcept of
historyfrom bisown rbcoryofvr cal"history. They point to what Fostersees tobe the lack
in Hegel's theoryofa properconceptof the free wil.
InFoster's usage,teleologyhastwo implications:(i) developmenttowards anendand(ii)that
individualsaremeans to thisend. ForFoster, inits teleologicalconception, the endorthcstare
is permanentlyrealized and therefore the slate cannot be seen as the product of human
purposes, Further, because human activity contributes to the operation anddevelopment of
a stat e whichthey do not consciously will, humans arc merely the"unconscious toolsof its
achievcmcm.?" He Slates that in Hegel's view'
Tob eu scdthusbytheWorldSpiritasamcan s toitse nd
iswhatconstitutesthehisloricalimportance ofapcop]c
or an event and the greatness of an i ndividual.~l
Accordingto Foster, Hegel's philosophyof historyis thus not about real history but
rather, is about a mere logical development. The implication of roste r's viewis that l tcgel
treatshisown subjective ideaof the state as essential andtreats what is actuallyessential, the
specific,historical epochs andevents,as mere appearance.
What issignilicant tonote at thispointis thatfor Foster, H egel's" metaphysical"account
of the state leaves no roomfor the activity of'thc humanwill. Foster argues that, while in
Hegel' s view human"reason" can be satisfied in the aCI of comprehending the intelligible
essenceof stateand history, and"desire" can he satisfiedin the ir accidents, Ihcre is no rcahn
for the satisfaction of the "will".61
(2) Ruler and Ruled
As noted earlier, Foster contends that, for Hegel, o ne attains ethical life only by
renouncing desireand by willing theuniversalandthat Hegel therefore dislinguishc.~ between
thosewho partakein ethicallife(andcomprehendthe universal)andthosewho partakein the
realmofdesire andwho thusda not participateinethicallifcbut onlyin the"economic" realm
Foster argues that the platonic metaphysicaldivision ofform andmatte r is thus embodicd in
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the class struciureof'Hc gel's state ina divisionbetweenthe ethicalrealm of the state proper
and the economicrealm ofcivil soclcty.?'
Fosler findssugg estions of this platonicdivisionin Hegel' s accountof the regulative
bodies of'civil society. Forexample, the public authority must maintainthe general order of
society, regulateexcessesinthe economy. insure the qualityof goods, andmake provisions
for tbc poor.' I Ieslates thaIthe enforcementoforder andthe maintenanceofsocialstandards
requireson the partort hoscwho enforce andmaintainthemthat they mustunderstandthe law
lind will it, whileit is further required that those upon whom the law is enforced neither
understandnor willit.'·· Fosler asserts that the same is likewise true of thecorporation, that
corporate control of ec onomic law demandsunderstanding onlyon the part of thosein an
execu tive capacity
This implicitbasis of class division along the linesof ruler and ruledbecomes explicit.
Foster claims, in Hegel' s distinc tion between a "uni versal class" of civil servants and a class
which merely wills the particular. Foster states'
Ifthis universalclassexercisedonlytheethicalwill by
whic h the subject accepts the law, its discrimination
would necessitate no transition fromsocietyto State.
BUI when Hegel proceeds...IO endow it ...with the
functi onof regulatingtheorderof society he isascrib-
ing to itan activity whichcan be exercised only in the
stme."'
Thusheargues, tha t therelationof thosewho haverenou ncedthe economicwillto those
engaged ineconomic ac tivity will be a relationofa governing class to a subject class." This
means thatin Hegel'sacc ount.the wholeof civil societyis maintainedas asubject classin the
srntc. and ils members. while they willbe ableto satisfythe economic will , will not beable to
salisfy thecthicslwill.'.... Foster contends that in Hegel's argu ment. ethical life, though not
• See above pp. 36·3 7.
available to the citizens ot the state, is availableto its rulers. He arguesfurther that a realm
of ethical lifeover andabove civil society(i.e., thcstate) is necessaryonly ifuncintroduces
thisspuriousclass division of rulerand ruled," He asserts that Hegel'sconceptofJ.lildum:, or
education,society's disciplineand socializationof'thcindividual ' s particular will, canonlybe
understoodas basedonthe platonic divisionofclasses. lie argu es that in Hegel's account it
is demanded of the educators or rulers that they know the universal lind that they impress it
upontheirsubjects. For Foster, it followsthat therelation of ruler to subject lsennlogocs to
thcrclationofa craftsman to simple mailerin thatbothrulerand craftsman brlngunivcrsaland
imelllgfblc form to thatwhichis formlessand penicular."
Fosterccn.raststhis division of thestate intoruler lindruled withthe Hobbesianaccount
afthe statewhich, heargues, nmlntalnsthc subject's freedom. Ho bbes' contcrulon thatthe re
isa state ofnature inwhich men exist priorto thestate implies that the subjectshave"form"
prior to the impositionof lawby the state. Foster contends that thisis significant because it
means that individualsarc not mere mailer awaiting the formwh ichthe slate givesthem, but
rather are completein their isolation from society."
According to Foste r. Hobbes' doctrineofthe statcor naturc alsoimpliesthat thehuman
willis not constrainedby reason. Againhe contrastsHegeland Hobbes. l ie argues thm, in
Hegel' s view, that the state is a timeless product ofa logical development implies lhat any
activity ofthe willupon th e laws or constitutionof the stateis rocrcpcrvcrslry." In Hobbes'
view. however, the state does not develop fromsometimeless ideabut is rather the crealion
of the human will. Foster stales, that inHobbes view:
{Thestate]was createdbyanactof willat th e contrac t
andis sustained inbcingat eachsucceedingmoment by
exerciseofa will itselfsimilarlycreative: the sovereign
Will. 1l •
According to Foster it isthe will ofthe peoplein thecontract that is actuallysovereign
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According 10 Fosler, theempiricistconceptofpositivelaw ste msfrom theviewtha t law
is theproductof a sovereig n will.and contradictsHegel' s viewthat any act ofwill uponthe
lawis perverse. In theempiricistco nception, it isthe willof the sovereign whichmakeslaw
obligatory. In Foster'sview , it is thus willand not reason which determines lawand. infact,
it is preci sely in so faras th e essence of law is opaque to reaso n that law ispositive. The
empiricistconccpnonorposhlv c law hastwo further characteristics, First , onthisview, law
is made an objec t for the subject and the enact men: of law presupposes that the subject
understands it. Second, law is thought tobe general or abstract and can never comprehend
theparticulardetailsorits ownfulfilmcnt. Foster argues thatthe fulfilmentoflaw, therefore,
requires an actof will onthe partof the subject andthat thesubject is free inso far as hiswill
is determined by nothing but himself. That whichis specifically imperative in a command
cannotbe theobject ofreason ordesire becauseonlythat which" is" canbe suchan objectand
the essenceof the imperative isthat it must be enacted; that it " is" not but "ought" to be.7•
According to Fosler, Hegeldocs nothave a true conceptof the so vereign willorofa
state whose unity is the pr oduct of its own will.'l Whereas the Hobbesianview sees the
government assubject to the sovereigntyofthe people' s will, Hege l, in subordinatingwillto
reason. subordinates the peopleto a ruler. Foster asserts that beca use Hegel does nothave
anadequateaccount ofsovereignty, heisunableto conceivelaw asthe product of willand
as necessarily positive.
(3) Institutions and P atriotism
Foster argues that a close consideration of Hegel's concept ion of parliamentary
institutions reveals that Heg el's concept of govemment allows no politicalfreedomfor the
cililcns of the state. \-Ie contends. that, for Hegel, parliameut'uy institutions serve two
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fun ctions: (i) they allow for th e expres s ion of public opinion (thus for the salisr,lclion ofthe
particularand arbitrary willof individuals);ami (ii) theyenlighten lhesubject as to thenecessary
g rounds fOTgovernment decisions." Foster argues, hcwcvcr. tbar in l Icgcl's account. public
o pinion contributes nothing to the subject's freedom and parliament is, in fact, unable In
demonstrate to thecitizenthe underlying reasonferthe actionsofthc state. l ie maintains tlsu
the first of'thesefimctioasis rendered useless by Hegel's own argmucnt aud thatthe second
is rendered impossible.
Accordingto FOSler, the expressionof publicopinion dnes 110 \ advancethe ethical
freedomof'thc subjectbecause. though theprimarysignificanceof'parliamcntaryinstitutions
is to permit the expressionofp ub!ic op inion,public opinion is irscjf'j ustitlcd onlyin so far <IS
it hasno effecton the sure." In Fosler ' s view,Hegelcannot allowpublicopiniontu haveany
effectupon governmentbecause he sees govcmmcm to be the ethical activity of'aselect few
and arguesthat the mass of people are capable of'cccnomicactivity ouly.
Foster is equallycritical of the second function of these institutions, andstates tlun
Hegel's account of this function renders his conceptof pnrllamcnt contmdictory Fosler
argues that on the one hand, Hegel states thai bydemonstrating the necessarygroundsof
government decisions,parliamentboth satisfiesthe requirement that the subjectbe conscious
o fthelawandarouses inthe subjectthe vinucof patriotism.Rut, Foster contends,ontheother
hand,Hegel slatesthat parliamentisincapable ofproviding insightinto thelogiculynecessary
principleswhichgovernthestate because thedecisionsoft heslateserve thetemporalinterests
oft hcstatc andarc subjectonly to"historical" justification." Aceordingto FOSler, in l legcl's
viewthecontingent, everyday decisionsandjudgmentsof'thchistoricalstate arc finite maucrs
which cannot bedeterminedby the concept of the state
For Foster, that thesubject cannot, inprinciple,becomeacquainted with tileunderlying
reasonof the stale is further evidence that hedocs notattainethical freedom. Poser contends
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that in Hegel's political Ihoughl Ihc subjcct is related to the state invirtue of patriotic sentiment
and not self-consciousIrccdo.n. He states:
Pamotism begins where, upon Hegel's doctrine, the
possibility of derivation from the concept ceases and
where lawbecomes positivein the proper sense cr the
word."
For Fosler, patriotismis thus simplythe acceptancecnhc positivehistorical regulations
of'thc state and it is onlyby the apparent subterfugeof identifying patriotismwith the ethical
will(whichknows and wills universal laws) that Hegel can claimthat subjectivefreedom is
maintained in the slate
On Fosler' s account, therefore, Hegel contradicts him-ellin that he argues both that
there is no supra-temporal standard by which the subject may judge the state and that
nonetheless the state is tobededuced from its iI...Jllimi concept. For Foster, thiscontradiction
canbe rendered intelligibleonlyif Hegclaccepts the platonicclassdivision andconcept orthe
philosopher-king. Ifthe citizencannot know thetrue fonn of fhestate, it mustbeimposedon
him by a ruler who can know the truth; he must be "educated" and "in-formed" by a
philosopher-king Fosler slates
...there is only one ground upon which accessto this
standard of judgment can be denied to the subject
himself: namely that he is incapable of the exercise of
philosophical reasonand is therefore inferior to those
who arc capable ofi l.lQ
li e argues however, thatl lcgcl denies the validity of the concept ofa philosopher-king
inorder to mnintnin the ethical freedomof the subject. BUI, says Foster, if one asserts the
Irccdom of thecitizenanddenies thevalidityof the conceptof the philosopher-king,onemust
also deny the concept of
"in-fbrmnticn" andtheconcept ofan"ideal" Slate. f oster argues that Hegel' s insistence
11131111<..' subject is free ccmradic.s the spurious metaphysics which hehas conjured and thus
leaves his philos ophy without an ohj ect. ' Tbcrcfhrein Foster's view, J kgel'~ politic'llthe\lry
isJUSIthat: a mere theory whichdoes nut confo rm 10the facts.that is, which docs nor conform
to the real, temp oral and cont ingent existc nccof'individunls and stales, As mere theory , Foste r
argues, "meta physical" philosophy, in particular the Philosophy pfRjght , ishclpfhlto I1cithc!
statesman nor citizen Andhestates
That it should be so very useless awakens the firsl
suspi cions of its superiority.. .. And hard upon the heels
of thai suspicion will follow the con viction thai the
whole .. metaph ysical dedu ction must miss its true
nature .... ' I ..
I'ostcr's criticism thus aims utthc centra l thesis of I lcgcl's thulIghl, fo r if illdividual
freedom can be asser ted only at lhe expense of li egel's theory ofrhc suuc. rbc» Hegel's
argument that the free will is the basis of his concept ofthe stat e will he called iuto question.
Thethrust uf'Foster's argumc m is tlnullegcl's pohtlca l idcalismcunnotnccounrfor theact ual
freedom of Individuals , lind is, ther efore . rightl y shillwrecked un the co ral reef (If lihc l'ill
realism
For Fos te r, it follow s that if real histor ical object s cannot be the objects ofphilusnphicnl
thought and there is no such thing as a "metaphysica l" object , then philosoph y has no object
whatso eve r.
.. In place ormctapbysical reason, Foster puis fort h hisow n "meta phorical-historical" view
which he believes is implied in I lcgcl's thought , Sec p 8 above
50
CIIAPTE R FIYE
Clli T ICISM OF FOSTER'S ANALYSIS I:
II EGEL'S CO NCEI'TI ON OF TilE IDEAL ANDTilE REAL
(I) Th e Eternity of the Stat e
In Fosler' s account tile implication of Hegel's theory of the slate >;that the citizen is
dominated not onlyby the ruling class but also bythe process of world history. On the one
hand. the citizen is informed by the ruler and on theother hand he is merely a means to the end
or wo rld histo ry
Foster's argumenthingcsonhischarnctcrizationor He!!.l's metaphysics andphilosophy
nrhislory nsIlia.Ollie. l ie argucsthntl Icgc1'st hought subordinatesthetemporal realmto some
spuri ous conc ept of an eter nal. timeless idea . Further, he maintains that the Hegelian state ,
because 11timeless naiuml uility. is the pro duct ofno cons cious human purpose. In contrnst
10 Fosler' s view, Iargue not only thatth e Hegelian stateis nortimelessbUIalso that it is very
muchthe product ofh umnnself-conscious purposes
Contrnry to Foster's account, in Hegel's argument, the "eternity"of the state liesnot
in slime timeless other-worldlyrealm, but in the fact thai it is a product of the infinitelyfree
will. For llcvcl.naturalobjects. as finite, are in a constant slate of alteration because of the
contmdicrionbetween sclf'andother.' The free willas~·referent ial beingis not in principle
subject tothis alteration because it containsnatural formas sublatedand is thus a unity orsctr
andother." Thcactivilyo fthewillis prccisciyto give itselfembodiment.totransformthe other
into a determinationofitself. Thereforc thecharacter of'the will.for Hegel. isthat it is the true
AgainSl'c~.Scetion 92 .
.. As argued above(p. 19) to define the free will solely in terms of property involves a
contradiction which implies a war of all agains, all.
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infinite which contains all finitude, difference. and limitation within ilsclfll For Hegel.
freedom, because infinite. implies the sublation of timc.
Hegel'spoliticalphilosophypresupposes thedevelopmentofthc conceptofthc freewill
in his psychology and the movement of his politicalthought is to show how the slate is the
product of this will. Theminimumpresupposition of Hcgcl's politicnl thought is the free will
in itsmost abstract form, that is, initsrelation to external naturalobjectsandotbcr individuals
who are "conscious or their own particularity and diversity.':" Frornthis starting point tile
actionof the willis to overcomethedifference between ltself'and its other, 10 maketheother
its own, and thereby 10 embody itself in its other. The free willdetermines itselfin the actual
worldby transforming what is the "merely given" in accordancewith its concept. The will' s
self-reflected and self-determinedactivity is thus in principleeternal,but not in the sense of
an abstraction from the finite world. Rather its activity is self-determination in the finite nnd
real world. According to Hegelt he practical development or tlrc free will is an historical
precess; the successivetransformation and appropriation of the otherness of the objective
realmby the subjectivewill. Historytherefore, is nothing other than theself;developmentof
the free will. How then,can Foster find inHegel's politicalthought a slate whichis the result
of noconscious purpose anda processofworld historywhichuses individualsas its toolsand
instruments? Foster's misundcrstandingof'Hcgel's vlcworbtstorycentres aroundhisconcept
of the "cunning of reason". Hegel states:
It iswhat wemaycallthe cunning of'rcrson that it sets
the passionsto work in its service....K4
He uses the phrase the "cunningof reason"as a metaphor for the implicitrealization of
spirit in the immediateor natural form of the human will, that is, for the will's unconscious
impulse towards freedom.' Even in one's most personal and particulardesires one is free,
It is important note that the term"passion" in this context is used in a far more inclusive
scnscthar, is normally the case. It refers to the broad scopeof man's particular interests,
character, desires, wants, talents, idiosyncrasies, etc
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according to Hegel One's actions show a command of nature and overcome one's
individualilybybringingone intoa relation10others;that is. they haveauniversalsignificance.
Thcunivcrsalsignificanccofanaction,Hegelargues,isltsirnplicitprinciple.Initiallyth emcans
ofrealizingthisprincipleappearassomethingextcmal to theuniversal,as mereparticularacts,
as the purelysubjectiveintercstsofind ividuals. Hegel argues, however, that passions, inthe
processofthcirow nself-fulfilment,createaunlversalorderofsocictyan dthat thissocialorder
in turn, is given power over the passions.
It becomes evident in history,Hegel contends, that the passionsroe thus not opposed
to the universal ethicalorder but arc the means by which it is achieved, Foster's point, that
individuals are merely instruments inso faras they are not conscious orth e endsthey serve.
would seem correct. The chiefelement which Foster neglects however, is the dialectical
clement, InHegel's argument,bothpassionand principlearemere abstractionsfromconcrete
human existence; humans nrc self-conscious intelligent beings and their reactions are
interwovenwith universalclcmcnts,withthegood and with welfare." Thecontentofpassion
byits very nature is ofuniversalsignificanceand isnot. as Foster assumes,radicallyopposed
to thc good."
Further, the processof history.which originates ina subjectunconsciousofhis freedom,
is precisely a development of that freedomfrom its implicit expressionin impulse and desire
to its self-conscious actualityin the state. In tenns of world history. Christianity represents,
forHegel, a liberation fromtheunconsciousnessof this process in the human recognitionthat
it is realizedin"the fullnessof lime" lindthat the end ofits development is free,self-conscious
spirituality. Fr01111he origin of Christianityonwards humanbeings are aware of the goal of
spiritand theprocessofhistorybecomesa self-conscious. self-development." - Once humans
II' It is important to note however, that the consciousnessof freedom is not always fully
explicitor perfect. Ratherfor Hegelwhatis accomplished andrealized inoneagebecomes
the assumptionof tilenextage,who inthe act orappropriatingthis starting point develop
a new principleof spirit. Whileconsciousofthe principlesofpast agesonecannot be fully
consclouscnhc principtcoronc'sownage orofthe agerocome.ForHegelthemovement
tlf each epoch is towards the developmentand consciousnessofits own principle.
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becomein some measureconsciousof their own freedom,theycan no longer be described
merely asunconscious tools. ForHegel. humansarcends in themselves, whoconsciouslywill
and actualize their own freedom. li e states:
No!onlydo they inthe very net of realizing (freedom]
make it the occasion of satisfying personal desires
whose purport is divcrscfrom that aun -.bUIthey share
in that ideal airuusclf...."
Man's ell leal fife has its principle in freedom, Hegel argues, and is elevated above all
necessityandchance.beyondallcontingencyand temporality." Therefore. forHegel.human
beings are both "in"time" and in a sensebeyond time", li e argues thattimeis a limited fbnn
of history, the meresuccession of epochs.ad.infi.ni.1.w. He callsthis thc spurious or negative
infinite,an interminable alterationbetweenonc epochand the next: a "time-t" which always
becomesa -nmc-z".
Therefore, considered solelyin terms of its merelytemporal movement, spiritappears
as incomplete and finite. However,according to flegel, the actual process of history is to
co.nprehcnd this limit. He states that timeis. in fact, the necessitywhich compels spirit to
manifestits inherent principle, that is 10give embodiment to the free wil1.'"' For Hegel.
therefore, history is the expression of spirit in time. the labour of transfbrming time in its
apparentdifferencefromspirit,into anexpressionofspirit or, inother words,thcdevelopment
of tile idealityof the real."
(2) The State l1S Essence and Existence
In contrast to Foster's criticisms,I haveargued that the state is eternal not in a merely
metaphysicalsense but becauseit is the product of the free will. Further I have argued thaI
because the state is the embodiment of the free will, the individual cannot be viewed as the
"tool" of history. Infact,forHegel,it isthestate andnot theindividualwhichis thctrue subject
S4
of history, So we must consider how it is that Fosler maintainsthat the true Hegelian state
is an ideal essence which is not involved in the actual, finite, changingrealm of history.
Foster argues that inHegel's account reason can discern an intelligible coreof history.
lie argues thai for Hegel, this ideal core is related to the merely historical as essence to
appearance. He states:
Thiscorc is thetotalsystemof universaldeterminations
which can be developed out of Ihe concept by the
dialectic of reason; it is what Hegel calls the "idea" of
Ihc stalc, andisthcpropcr objecl ofa~
llight.91
Foslercontends thaithiscore isrelatedtotheworldof historicalappearanceas intelligible
nature to sensiblenature and asformis to matter." According to Foster, fonnis the principle
which constitutes not only the uniqueness ofan object but also the identity of theobjectwith
othersof the same kind Hestatesthat theform ora tablefor exampleis not onlyidentical in
nlltablcs but is the principlcof unity in each, No object is possible except as a unity ofform
and runner and of these things the form is the universal and intelligibleand matter is the
particularand sensible."
But the core of Hegel' s argumentis that the ideal st. te iSllil1the simple essenceof the
state. Hccontcndsthatwhenwedislinguishbetweentheessenceofthestat eand itsappearance
weareconsideringthe state inits reality asaparticular nation boundbyspaceandtime. Within
this reahty, he argues, the distinctionbetween essenceandappearanceis actually a distinction
between the underlying consciousnessoffrccdomand the actually existing state as the object
and embodiment or this spirit. As Hegel argues, the "universal spirit is essentially present as
human consciousness.':" Moreover. Hegel argues that this universal has its phenomenal
1: 1 According to Hegelspiril is immediatelypresent to consciousness intheformof theobject
ofr ctigion
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reality in the state and. in contrast to Foster's caricature. he states:
In the caseof thespiritor concrete concept, however,
the phenomenonitselfis thecsscrninl.... T hephenom-
enalaspectofspirit isitsselfdeterminaticn,whichisthe
elementofitsconcretenature:thespiritwhichdocsnot
determineitselfisan abstraction oftheunderstanding."
ForHegel, inthe caseofspirit."essence isexistence"and"existenceisessence" SpiriHml
activity is self-determining and its freedomconsists precisely in trall.~r\lrm il1g whatconfronts
it as mereexternality into its own embodiment. What Hegel callsthe "concept" is thc unity
of selfandother, ofessenceandappearance. The stale thus sublarcs the subjective willwhich
is il ~ source and infact, is nothing other thanitsconcrete existence, There is thus nnessential
reciprocity between the suuc and thc individual's consciousness of his Iocedom, The
objectivityofthestate is theindividual's objectivitylindconverselyIheindividual's conscious-
nessof'hisfreedomis the state' s ownsubjectivelife. Theobjectiverenlmof'spiritunlexistence
or freedom is thus the state and its motivatingprinciple is the subjectivewill. Subjectivity
standsoutsidethest3 teonlyinthemindofthecommentatororsofnras thewbjcctconsciously
abstracts himselffrom its laws and customs, and it is thus only in abstraction fromthe actual
state that a distinction of subjective essencelind objectiveappearance can be maintained,
(3) The Real and the Ideal State
Hegel's account of the relationof thcvidcal'' state to the "real" state is vastlydiflcrcnt
thantheone which FOSlerascribesto him. Acarefulanalysisrevealsthat, inHegel's view, the
idealstate is not to be radically separated fromeither therealstate or the frce wilt According
to Hegel, the ideal state develops out of the activityof the rcal state and is norsome eternal
"idea" or essence in which the real state but feehlyparticipates. Hegel contends that the
development of tile ideal slate is the development of the nation's own thought, that is, its
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movement froma primitive or merely naturalawareness to a thinking culture. Correlativeto
this development is the emergence ora free self-conscious life among its citizens;and it is in
the self-consciousness of'its citizens that the nation's spirit or ideal side is actualized. On this
view, theveryessenceora nation's spirit is theactivity whereby it realizesits potentialityand
makesitsclfitsown deed. its ownwork. Inmoreconcrete terms, anation's spiritualact isthe
process whereby itdevelops itselffromits largely restricted andmerelynational reality to its
free ideality, 10 an actual "idea" of itself, articulatedin its art, religion and philosophy. The
ideal state is the result of an actual historical development through whicha definitecultural
and intellectual idea of the state has been accomplished. Through this process the universal
irucrcstsof the citizens ore stale becomeobjectivefor them." According to Hegel,it iswithin
the stare that the individual's powers of reflection are developed. He sees this as the
development of the state's own self-reflection. Individuals have a measure of independcnce
in the sretcvin that they candistinguish betweentheirownego andthe universal." 91 He argues
in the Philosophy of Rjgbt that theethicalorder and its laws are not simply the product of the
subjectivewillbutalsostand overandagainstthesubject asanabsolute authority.99 Acutrure's
self-consciousnessand thought developsthroughtheeducationcf the particular will. Initially,
however. freedomliesonlyintheexternalobjectivityof the stalewhichstandsoverandagainst
theindividual subjectas power and authority. In Iheoriental worldonlythe ruler isfree(a1beit
in II very primitiveway) lind the subject partakes of this freedom only through the sentiment
ofobedience,a non-reflective relation to the objective realmin that thesubject finds his own
freedomin II merely external power. Because the freedom of individualcitizensdoes nothave
an oblcctlvc form, it remains undeveloped and freedom appears in this realm only as the
authorityof tilestate as embodied in a particular ruler. This relation of force and submission
is the basis of the Oriental realm,Hegel argues.· Individual self-reflection develops invirtue
Sec The philosophy of l-lis[ory, pp.111-219, for an account of the Oriental World. He
describes itas a world inwhich"nothing subjectivein theshapeofdisposition, conscience,
{or) formal freedomis recognized" andwhere"government existsonlyas the prerogative
of'compulsion't.Ip.fll )
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of this initial discipline of the particular will.'oo This discipline develops the object ive nnd
universallawsofthestateintotheparticularity oftheindividualwill.andlikewisetheparticular
willis raised10 a consciousnessof an objectiveuniversalrealm.
Thuswhereasinthe faceofthe oftheemperor's power,thesubjectof thcOricntaJworld
isa mere slave,the wholedevelopmentarthe relationof'individualandstate istheovercoming
ofthisdisparitysothat thestatemoreexplicitlyembodiesthesubject's freedom. 111 hismaslerl
slaveanalogyHegel describes this developmentsuccinctly:
... the slave, however, in the service of his master,
works off his individualist self-will. oyer-comes the
inner immediacy orappeute, and in thisdivestment of
self and in ' fear of his lord' makes 'the beginningof
wisdom'-- the passage to universal self- conscious-
ncss.:"
The subject educated to a knowledgeof hisunity with the universalcannot besatisfied
with the objectivedisparity betweenruler and ruled. Hegel states:
...theservileself-consciousness freeing itselfbothfrom
the individuality of the masterand from its own indi-
~~.~.~~~y, graspstheabsolutelyrational inits universal-
Thesubjectivewillthusconfidentofits ownfreedomtransforms the objectiverealmand
individual self-consciousnessis in this way boththe productof thcstate and the state's own
self-consciousness.
For Hegel, a nation's greatest achievementis self-understanding; the fullself-compre-
hension of its owncustoms, laws, institutions, of the wholesphere of its ethical life. Andthis
self-understanding is its ideal life. This ideal life therefore, is nOI some perfect abstract
attainment, according to Hegel, but is the end ol'thc real work of thenation, the duskofits
ethicalactivity. He argues that"thinkingculture",a community's rationalself-consciousness
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and self-expressionin art, science, religion,and philosophy, is both the completion and the
corruptioncf the state. Thinking culture,the highest developmentof 'the state, sets itsclfover
and against the state and is its dissolution?"
(4) Dialectic of the Real and the Id eal
Thought, according to Hegel, is the negation of the finite and determinate. By
comprehendingilsclfinIhought, byraisingits implicit principleto self-consciousness,a nation
overcomesitsgeographicaland temporallimitations. Thethought ofPlato, forexampJe, lives
on though Athens has fallen. More philosophically though, the principle developed in a
particular state becomes the starting point of the next phase of world history, whose "real"
activityis the objectivedcrerrninarion of this principle.
Thus lit the historical point when a particular state has reached its completion, a
contradiction between its ideal lind its real moments presents itself. The thinking reflection
upon the state isolates its rational spirit and thus stands in opposition to all that is merely
particular.determinate,andlimited inthcstate . Social bondsare thusbroken,Hegelcontends,
and subjectivity takes refuge in indivlduallty.t'" The declineof the Greek state is a striking
example of this process. According to Hegel, Greek democracy is based on the non-
differentiatedunion of customlind moraldisposition. Because the citizensare not conscious
of private interests they may be entrusted with the responsibility of the state. In Athens all
citizensenter into the governmentand the activespirit ofthe state ispresent in the particular
actions or bcr people 10' Individuals arc recognizedas citizens onlyin so far as theywill the
objectiveends of the state.
This acsthcric harmony is corrupted bv a subjective principle which emerges in
democracyitself, inthe implicitdifferencesbetweenindividuals. As oneattempts to persuade
one's fellowcitizento one's side inthepublicassembly,argumentand reflectionarerequired,
disciplines IheGreeks acquirefromthe sophists.U16 In their principlethat manis the measure
of all things is the notion that all thingsare 10be related to the subject. In so far as thought
distinguishes itself. as the measure of all. from the customs of the polis, the potential for
arbitrarinessandcapricearises. Thereare no objectiveprinciplesinabstractionfromthe stale
whichcanrelate the individualto theobjectiverealm.Thisdiflcrcntiat ionis furtherdeveloped
by Socrates whose negativedialectic makes subjectivity a revolutionarymoral principle.
Subjectivitythus determines itself over and againstthe starc.t" TIle state. because it stands
opposedthe subject. becomes a merely finiteobject, a merely natural unity from whichspirit
has withdrawn.
Thisheightened subjectivityoverturns both the religious and politicalorders: Men no
longer consultoracles and slaverymustbe abolished. In~, Socrates demonstrates
that cvena slaveboycanhaveunivcrsalknowledgeandpowersofrel1ection,nndis thusequal
to the citizen. Accordingto Hegel, thisprincipleofsubjectivity becomes the principleof the
Roman world.t'"
Hegelargues thatalthoughthisdivisionofidealand realdissolves thebonds cftbesure,
it alsogives riseto a newprinciple. Whereas the principlewhichmotivated the nationwasat
first merely implicit in its laws andexternal affairs, in thinking culture this principle is made
explicit. and given the formof universality. Hegelargues that thischangealso brings with it
newlindadditionaldeterminationsof contenI. developments inart, religionandphilo!«"lphy.'<fJ
ForHegel,contraryto Foster'sview, theslate's intelligibilityand eternityis fullymanifest
onlyonce its practical and particular activity is accomplished. The idealization of the stale
transforms its merely linear history and gives it the form of universality in religious
representation and in philosophical conceptualization. As noted earlier. the concept of the
modern state is the free will, and the philosophical demonstration of the necessityof this
concept shows that the institutions of thestate have the formoft he free will.Jhatthey arcits
••
embodiments, Foster fails10understand Hegel's viewofthephilosophicalconceptoft hestale.
He sees Hegel' s developmentof the institutionsof the state fromthe concept to be a merely
logical and B....Illinri demonstration. According to Hegel. however, to speak of the state as
logically prior 10temporality is to speak in abstraction. Indeed, for Hegel, logic itself is an
abstraction fromthe actual world of hurnanactivityand consciousness. He slates:
Logic, then. has for its presupposition the science of
manifested spirit,whichcontainsanddemonstrates the
necessity,and so the truth of'the standpoint occupied
by pure knowing andof its mediation."?
By contrast, the ideaof'the state is not an abstraction from a particular state; rather it
isthe negationofits particularity andfinitude, therecognitionof the finiteas, intruth,amoment
of'thc infinite. Whereasanabstractionleavestheworld muchas it finds it, theideaof the state
transforms the nation in which it develops. According to Hegel the concept of the state
ccutninsa whole history of spirit in its universal principle; for example, abstract right is the
principleofthc Romanworldand moralityis the principleof fheReformation."! The concept
of the state is thus not a timeless merelylogical structure as Foster portrays it. Rather, the
concept containsthe wholehistoryof thestate,but, havingnegated its historicalcontingency,
the concept expressesthis history in philosophical form, as necessary moments of the free
will.m
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CIIAI'TE R SIX
CRITI CISM OF FOSTER'S ANALYSIS II :
IIEGEL'S CONCEI'TION OF Til E RELATION OF
Til E STATE TO Til E INDIVIIJUAL
Once we have foundFoster's characterization of'Hcgcl's metaphysicsand philosophy
of history to be untenable it follows that his particu lar criticisms with regards 10 the relation
ofrulerand ruled. politicalinstitutions, patriotism. CIC., arc invalid. As we haveseen, I legct's
"metaphysics" is nor platonic; I wish to show that his cbarac rcnzatiou of the individual's
relation to the stale follows suit.
(I) T he Ruling Class
Firstwe must considerFoster' sview that in Hegel's concept ofthc statethere is implied
a division between an ethical class which wills the universal law, and therefore regulates
society, anda classwhoby virtue oftb cir attachment to their own particular desires mcst bc
regulated. With regard 10 the public authority this claim is manifestly erroneous. In Hegel's
view, since the whole of ethica l life requires the fullest recognition of'thc subjective will, it is
clear that the subject has the right to know and understand the laws he obeys and that these
laws are his own objectivity. The not ion ofa public author ity whose activity is the bringing
oforder to anotherwisc ordcrtess mass simply does not mesh with ' lcgcl's account . It is tel1ing
that Hegel argues that the public authority is responsible for regulating even non-criminal
actions He states:
...the subject ive willing which i ~ permissible in actions
lawful~ and in the private use of property, also
comes into external relation with other single perso ns,
as well as public institutio ns....ru
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I lcargues thatthe effect ofon e's actions on o thers need noilic in on e's pu rpose and m ay
always, inadvertently, be wrongful and that , therefore, police protec tion is needed!" The
poi nt is thru. for Hegel. the activi ty of the publicauthority does no t presuppose a public
ignnnmi of the univcrsal law; tho ugh one may kno w the law o ne may inadvert e ntly inmo ge
upo n IIIUllhcT'S ri~ht s and this situation re q uires the p ublic a ut hority .
Foster's vieworthe corporation is skewedalong the samelines as his account orthe
public authority. li e argiles tha t in the corpo ration only those in charge arc a ware of the
commoninterestswhichdeterminetheactionsofindividual members andthato nlytheyhave
01 tIIe,I5UfCof consciouscontrol of this interrelation ofuoiversal good and particular desire.
Again thereis simply00 supportin Hegel's argument for this caricature. He expresslystates
that ill thecorporationthe memberbecomesfreedfrom theparticular isolationofhiscrafl and
is"e levated 10 conscious effort for a commonend."!"
l-nsrcr ts contention that civil servants ruleover a class which willsthe particular, is
equallyrmc -s idcd Civil servants areconcernedwith thc univer sal asit appearsin civilsociety.
Asarguedea rlierthe fullprinciple of'cthica l lifeisnot developedat this stage. Th e"universal
class' is so called notbecause its memberspossessanygreat insight into theprinciple of the
stare butbecause the comcn:of theirwork isnotmerelylimited to their ownpart icular craft
or inter est. Rather in their work civil serv ants are concerned withthe general condition of
s ociety . In this light, to translate universal classas civil scrvants is perhaps too specificas the
above charac te rization would also describe professionals such as educators, health-care
personnel.those illthejusticesystem,as wellascivil servantsproper. Further, forHegel, the
divisionof'clnsscsarisesin the systemof needsand sucha divisionis not characteristicof the
pelhicnl relntion of the stale to its cinzcns .
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(2) Bildun g and Law
A careful consideration of Hegel's co nceptsof.llildJ.lng and positive law is further
evidence that a ruler/ruled dichotomycannot begrafted onto his concept cf'the state.
Th eHegelianconceptofeducationor"i n-formation"stands instark contrast 10Foster's
charge of pialonism. In the first place, inHegel's accc uur.thcindividual cannot be described
as formless matter. Individuality is infinite subjectivity; sell-realizing,sclt-detcmuning Conn.
Individuals are nOIsimply"particulars", rather they possessa univers..tl character by virtueof
their self-consciousness. Individuals are, in principle. free, Hegel argues, and the education
gained in the state docs not result in the att ainment of some higher standpoint beyondthis
freedom . Rather, education merely makes explicit the subject'sown potcutlnthlcs. Educated
to its end, spirit becomesobjective to itself, Hegelergucs. Thus the purpose of education is
liberati on andenhanced consciousnessof one ' s freedom!" Its veryactivity overcomes any
dichoto mybetweenthose who arc educators andthose whoarc 10 beeducated. Further, in
the Hegelian co ncept of the stale no one class is identifiedas uniquely in need of ethical
education. In Hegel' s view of the state, all subjects undergo the discipline of the objective
realm. Inthe workplace, in thefamily,inclubsand societies, and inone's class,cue becomes
used to relating to others and one's opinions and needs take their place within a universal
selling asone among many others. This socialization is insomeinstances"forced" upon onc
by parents, managers, club presidents, premiers, etc., but much of it occurs simply from
observingthe rules. conventionsandcustoms ofone's situation and fromthesimple desire to
lit in. In the wo rk place it is necessaryto cooperate with one's co-workers and to produce
quality products . One' sbosshardly needremindone of this. Thepoint is thatethical education
does not necessarilylake the top-down route Fu~ : .. . suggests
Foster' s criticismofH(~gel is based in part,on his preference for Hobbes' accountof'thc
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stateofnature. IndcnyingHobbcsaccount.however. Hegeldoesnot imply,as Foster suggests
hedocs.that prior10 thestatesubjeasa relikematterwitbout form. ForHegel there is nosuch
thing as a subjcc t ou tside the lillie end, in his v iew. tc speale ofind ividuals exist ing so meho w
prim toc routslde the rational historicaldevelopment off reedo,", isanabstraetion. As human
beings.we arc bornwith arational willwhosemovement isto objectif'yitself in theworld. and
the sta te is thu s implicit in even the crud est obj ect ification o f'tbe human will. Foster argu es
thai unless subjects arc conceived to exist prior to the state they willnot possess ~;lei r own
identity or independent intelligibility and therefore must begivenfonn by the ruler. Fosler's
conclusion docs not follow, however, because Hegel denies that there is such a thing as a pre-
social human lind to speak of a ruler as socializing a pre-social individual, as in-forming him,
is thus not adequate to Hegel's account.
l ikewise. FOSler's clai-nrhet if the state is eternalthen anyact ofwill upon it willbeII
perversion of its nature, presupposes thar by co ntra st 10 the absolute willof the state, the
irxlividual'swillis finite. As noted earlicr, however. Hegcl' swhole argument is that the modem
state is the productoettlesubjective will andthai both therefore occupy the same standpoint
of spirit• subjective and objectiverespectively. When Hegel argues that the subject cannot
wilfullychange Ihelawsof thestate, heisnotdenyingthesovereignanactivity ofwill. Rather,
he is nrguing lhal in rhc modem sta te tbe laws lire in principleu,eproducts of the subjective
will. To contend thatlaw-making is simplya matter of collectingand publicizing individual
laws.asopposed tocreating them,does notdenyanactivityofwill. Thecustomsandtraditions
fromwhich laws arcdrawn arenOI simplythe time-wornprejudicesofby.gone days; t"~y are
nolrl. r simply given nor blindly followed. Rather, they arc the products of the actions of
individuals who sustain them in their observance. To bring these together into a consistent
raliclIlal lcgal code. is In make explicit IIuniversalityalready implicit incustomand in no way
dcnicsthatncw lawscanbc tbeeght ofandmade. Infact, Hegelargues that the needforfunher
determinationof thclegalcode iscontinual."! What Uegel isasserting,however, is that these
determinations willnot bemere abstractthoughtsor ouglu-to-bc'sdeducedfrommerereason
but rather will arise in the context of culture and tradition. This does not deny laws which
attemptto changethings,forexample, to rootout prejudice.butdocsmakethe pointuuulaws
can heeffectiveonly if societyhasdeveloped an acceptanceof'law, (hal the true context of
law ishuman, cultural self-consciousness.
It istherefore thecasethatHegelhasadefinite conceptioncfthccontlngcncyofposltivc
law: (i) it must be applied to contingent events: (ii) it is a universalization of contingent
customs;(iii)it istheproductoff he activityofwill. Thus unlike Foster, l iege!docsnotconsider
willand reason to be radicallyscparerc.
(3) rarliamcnt and Patriotism
Foster's misunderstandingof Hegel's position is furtherapparentin his consideration
ofHegcl's viewof'thc effieaeyofparliamenlary ins tlturions. Foster contends thlll contrary 10
Hegel'sview, parliamentary institutions do not educate the subjectas to the necessaryground
ofthe state. Hegel's statementthat the Estates,what we wouldcellthe parties in parliament,
provide "insight into the situationand the concept of the slate and its afflli,s"docs not refer
to the strictlyphilosophicalconceptof' thc state. Rather.H egel is referring toth e fact thnt by
witnessing debates in the assemblythe citizen can sec thllt the state, in ill' universality, is
concerned withthe particular interestsof individuals. This unionofunivcrsaland particular.
the concrete universal, is the conceptof the state to whichhe refersand which, though not
demonstrated in its philosophical necessity, is subject to historical-political demonstration
Hegels tates:
Regarded as a mediating organ, the Estates stand
betweenthegovernmentingeneralontheonc handlind
the nationbrokeninto particulars(peopleandassocia-
tions) on the othcr.t''
This unionof universal and particular, as present in a given state, containsan element
of contingency, that is to say, in its particularity it cannot be demonstratedas following
necessarily fromits concept. Rather,theconcept of the state, or the freewill,must beshown
to pervade theparticular issueswithwhicha stateisconcemed, e.g.,fairtaxes, publichousing,
crirneprevcntion.
In the light of the contextinwhich Hegelusesthe term"concept" inthe aboveexample,
itbecomesapparentthatFoster's criticlsmofHegel'aviewofpatnotismmissesthemark. Even
under Foster's criterion, Hegel is not involved in a contradiction when hebasespatriotismon
knowledge or the concept, definedin this limited way.
Further, for Hegel, patriotish' is not simply an irrational sentimentwhichisopposed to
theconcept. Rather it isa relationto the state at the levelof'Ieellng,the conviction that one's
universalandparticular interestsareindeed maintainedinthe state l.·,d, evenat thelevelofthis
verybasic sentiment, patriotismis free and reasonable. It is freeand reasonablebecause the
state is immediatelyrelated to the individual andthe individual findshisown essentialinterests
reflected in the apparentothernessof the state. For Hegel patrioticsentiment isthe common,
everyday sense of eivic order or community spirit. not some heroic, non-rational, self-
sacrificia l passion
Also. in reference to Foster's criticismof Hegel' s account of free speech, it is terribly
one-sided to sccpnrliamcntaryinsuu nionsasjusttf led whilehavingnoeffect.For Hegel, public
opinion is two-sided; ;1coruainsnotonlyeternalprinciplesand the correcthabitsandgenuine
needs of eOllllllunity lifebut alsoagood dealofsheer prejudice andpcrvcrelty.'" Itis merely
the negativeside of publie opinionwhichmusthe rendered innocuousin the debates of the
estates.'> Hegel argues that publicopinion must be respected as well as despisedfor the
principleof the modem world issubjective freedom. andthe right to insightandargument are
necessary to ethicallife . While it mustbe tempered by the rationalityof'thcconstitution and
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the public criticism of'the assembly, inHegel's view. public opin ionis a po werful forceand
in fact contains in itswisdom and prejudicethe heart and essence ofits agc.m
Thus in H egel's conce pt of the slate , parliamentary institutions arc essential to the
freedom orall individuals. Hegelarguesthat they med iatebetween the universal policieso f
the government and the particular interests of individuals. Ir is apparent, therefore. that
Hegel's account of parliament is not "confused" asFoster puts it. Hisaccount ofpntriotism
isclearlydistinguishedfrom hisaccountof civillawand parliamentaryinstitutions do infact.
guarantee subjectivefreedom.
(4) Conclusion
Contrary to Foster's view,we must concludeth at Hegel 's thought is not drivenby an
implicitplatonlSill. Thereforehcdoes notrequireaconception of aphilosopher-klngorIIruling
class in order to render his thought consistent.
Onthccne hand, to ergocthat thcdcvclcpmcntoflhcstatc fromthe concept.isnecessary
and reasonable is notto posit some other-worldlyessence of the state. To contend that the
individualcannot judge the statein termsof another -worldlystandard docs not requireany
politicaldivisio n between those who can and those who cannot knowthe truth
Fromour discussion orthe idealand the real it should also be apparent that IIcgcl 's
concept of the stale is nOI tied to a Platonic metaphysic. For I regcl,onlythe ideal stale can
bedemonstrated inits necessityand this takes two inter-relat ed forms: (i) the state must he
shown 10bcthc necessaryobjectificationof tilesubjec tivewill andOi)the subjectivewillmust
beshowntobe tbesate's ownsubjectivityand thesta te asaco ncrctcunivcrsalmust bcshown
to undergo its own necessaryself-development. What sustains thestate is the spiritor its
people, andthe Slatehas its subjectiveside in thisspirit ; inits citizens' consciousnessof thcir
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freedomend in the collectivity ofthci r individual purposes. For Hegel, the ideal state arises
from the real state and though it marks the disso lution oCthe real slate, it is also its highest
development.
On the other hand,it is spurious to argue that sincethe individual doesnot haveaccess
10anot her-worldlystandard,hisknowledge of'the slate is limited, because,for Hegel,there
simplyis noother-worldlystandard. InHegel' s argument, the slate is eternallypresentand
is not II timeless abstraction as Fostermaintains. Both the idealand therealslate areseen as
momentswithinthe history of an actual state. Further, Hegelasserts the radical identity of
individual and state . Since the state is the objectivityof the subjective will which in turn
constitutesthe state's ownsubjectivelife, tojudge the statefroman externalstandpointwould
require that the subjectstep outsidehimself and for Hegel this isa mere abstraction.
Hegel's philosophydocs notfallinto thedichotomiesof platonismor evenof liberalism,
forthat matter. Its whole importisto demonstrate theunity oflhe realandthe idealslate and
anile politicaland the individual will. Heconceivesthesedivisionsin termsofa different. set
ofrelations than does Foster. For Hegel, we are not concernedwith the relation between
"state-of-nature" and society but between the state in its natural beginningsand in its full
development as"thinking culture". Nor are weconcernedwitha divisionbetweenthe moral
willand the economicwill. but with the relation between the free willin its relation to an
objectiveanduniversalgoodandIhefreewillinits relationto itsmerelysubjectiveor particular
satisfaction. In each oflhcse instancesHegeltakes each side of'the relation as a limited form
ofthc truthand contendsthnt the fulltruth lies in their reconciliation. Aboveallelse,Hegel's
doctrine of'thcstate isa severecriticismof'abstract or metaphysical conceptionsof morality,
eternity, individual ityand poluical lifc. A careful analysisof thccontext and meaningof his
concepts reveals thai it is his preciseintent to comprehend abstract dichotomiesand to
demonstrate that concrete humanfreedomis the principleof all politicalactivity,
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InconsideringFosler's argumentone: is struck bythe dcrth or itsmisrepresentlltion of
suchconceptsasthemoralwill. civil society.freedom,, ndHegel'sconceptoflhe s ateovcn ll
Fostercannot enterinto tilespirit ofHegd' sargumcnlbecausehis ownduali51icpresupro-
sitioosrenderHegel' s trinitarian standpointuninlelligible and confused. Foster llSSlJmcs.
divisionof reasonand desireand he thereforefails 10 comprehend t1Ll l lhm ughoul Ilegd's
analysis thesignificance aftivit sodetyisthai it istheobjcctilicationoruemoralwil. FOSler
maintainsa radicaldivisionof timeand eternityand therefor e liefailsdearly10 explicate the
freedomof'the will in history and theeternityor the state as theproduct cf'tbe freewill
Tnline withmuch earlytwentieth centuryliberal thought, Fosler attributes10 Hcgd D
formof totalitarianism. II hasbeenthe burdenof thisessay to show that the concept of tile
free willpermeates each aspect ofl lcgcl's politieal llhilosophy; thatthe prorcr dinlectiCiI
underslanding orhis concepts reveals the slateas the thorougldy concrete embodiment of
freedom;and thatihe chargeof totalitarianismis therefore unfounded.
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